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The importance of culture in helping explain and understand behavior is generally accepted. Scholars in the area of
information security have argued that security culture is a key factor in safeguarding information assets. Scholars in
the area of professional culture have argued that differences in cultures across professions must be accounted for,
in correctly assessing the influence of culture. Combining these arguments, we suggest that differences in security
cultures across professions need to be examined to fully comprehend the influences of security culture. The current
study uses a qualitative approach to further the understanding of information security cultures across four
professions: Information Systems, Accounting, Human Resources, and Marketing. The concept of security culture is
articulated, and the security cultures of the four professions are characterized to demonstrate that there are
significant variations in security culture across these professions. The study also shows that information security
continues to be viewed as a technical problem, that even the most conservative and rule-compliant groups may
violate security rules under performance pressure, and that awareness by itself is not sufficient to build a strong
security culture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Culture has emerged as a key construct in organizational and information systems (IS) research. There are myriad
conceptualizations and definitions of culture (comprehensive reviews are provided by Leidner and Kayworth [2006];
Straub, Loch, Evaristo, Karahanna and Strite [2002]), but there is general agreement that culture includes a shared
set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that help shape subsequent behavior of a social group [Kroeber and
Kluckhohn, 1963]. When viewed at the organizational level, culture helps employees make sense of the firm and
provides norms for their behavior [Deshpande and Webster, 1989; Gregory 1983]. It has also been shown that
culture is predictive of performance [e.g., Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992]. As the need to safeguard information
assets has become increasingly important [e.g., Dhillon, 1997; Von Solms, 2000], scholars have advocated the
1
development of a strong information security culture to enhance protection of such assets [Ruighaver, Maynard and
Chang, 2007; Vroom and Von Solms, 2004]. Researchers believe that technical controls and information security
policies alone are not adequate to ensure information security. In addition to the technical controls and security
policies, an information security culture is deemed necessary to ensure behavior compliant with information security
needs [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004].
Most research in the area focuses on information security culture in the context of organizations [e.g., Ruighaver et
al., 2007]. Furthermore, most researchers adopt a monolithic view of organizational security culture (i.e., that the
security culture is uniform across different groups in organizations). Studies of culture (unrelated to security culture)
in organizations have shown the existence of differentiated cultures [Chatman, Polzer, Barsade and Neale, 1998;
Jermier, Slocum, Fry and Gaines, 1991], including differences in cultures across occupations and professions [Trice,
1993]. Differentiated cultures have been shown to lead to differences in the thinking, reasoning, and priorities of
different professional groups [Hansen, 1995; Mills and Tsamenyeni, 2000], which in turn could lead to
intraorganizational conflicts and consequent failure of larger initiatives [e.g., Rao and Ramachandran, 2011].
Analogously, it can be argued that differences in information security cultures across professions could lead to
differences in thinking and reasoning about security issues, and possibly conflicts in and failure of information
security initiatives. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the differences in information security cultures
across professions. Thus, the primary goals of the current research are to determine if there are differences in
security cultures across professions, and, if so, what are the differences? Implicit in this statement is that we are
studying information security culture at the level of a profession.
An understanding of the differences is important both to research and to practice. In research, monolithic
characterization of information security culture may obscure important relationships between security culture and
other variables. For instance, a researcher examining the effect of security policies on security culture may not find
any effect. In reality, it is possible that it affects the security culture of groups that tend to be more rule-compliant,
and not that of groups who tend to be less rule-compliant. Examined as a whole, the relationship may be obscured.
In practice, there is the possibility of conflicts between groups because of differences in security cultures. For
instance, if a professional group believes that information security is the responsibility of information systems (IS)
personnel, and information security personnel believe that all users are responsible, then it is possible that the
professional group fails to take seriously security policies proposed by the IS group, particularly if the policies require
effort by the professional group. The policies may be viewed by the professional group as an attempt by IS
personnel to shirk their responsibilities. Knowledge of such differences in cultural beliefs will enable management to
take steps necessary to ensure that security initiatives are not misconstrued. Thus, understanding the differences in
security cultures across professions is important for the field of information security.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss relevant literature. Following this, we
outline the theoretical bases and methodological issues. Next, we report our results. In the subsequent section, we
present our key findings, summarize our contributions, and state the limitations of the study. Lastly, we make some
concluding remarks.

Variations in Information Security Cultures across Professions: A Qualitative
Study
1

We use the terms “information security culture” and “security culture” interchangeably.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Culture
The complexity and ambiguity associated with the study of culture has been acknowledged by scholars [Leidner and
Kayworth, 2006; Schein, 2004; Trice and Beyer, 1993]. In 1963, Kroeber and Kluckhohn identified about 164
definitions [Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1963]; in 2006, Leidner and Kayworth reported that there were about 359
definitions [Leidner and Kayworth, 2006]. We provide a brief sampling of the definitions over the years to illustrate
the complexity (see Table 1). The definitions appear to have two parts. The first part reflects that culture is viewed as
an aggregation, and the second part lists the components. The aggregation aspect is seen in the part of the
definition that states culture is viewed as “a complex whole which includes…,” “…embraces all the manifestations of
…” “…the totality of ..,” “as the sum total of ..,” and so on. Culture is seen as an aggregation of components that
includes terms such as “knowledge,” “beliefs,” “habits,” “values,” “ideas,” “behaviors,” “concepts,” “attitudes,” and so
on.

Source
Tylor [1871]
Boas [1930]

Kroeber and Parsons
[1958]
Thurnwald [1950]
Kluckhohn [1949]
Geertz [1973]]

Kroeber and
Kluckhohn [1952]

Table 1: Some Definitions of Culture from Literature
Definition
“…complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society.” (p. 1)
“Embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the
individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of
human activities as determined by these habits.” (p. 79)
“Transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic
meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts
produced through the behavior.” (p. 583)
Defines culture as the totality of usages and adjustments that relate to family, political
formation, economy, labor, custom, law, and ways of thought.
Defines culture as a “social legacy” that an individual acquires from his/her group.
“Historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate,
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” (p. 89)
“It is a plan, not the living itself; it is that which selectively channels men’s reactions, it is
not the reaction themselves.” (p. 120)

The complexity of the conceptualization presents challenges at two levels: in the meaning of the terms used to
define culture, and in the observation and measurement of culture. Terms such as “beliefs” and “ideas” are mostly
used in the common everyday meaning of the words, without precise definitions being assigned to them. When
observing culture, the challenge is to determine if it is sufficient to focus on one or some aspects of culture or if all
aspects have to be taken into consideration. Schein [1985] proposed a three-layer model, which addresses the
second of these issues. The three layers comprise artifacts, values, and assumptions. Artifacts are visible
manifestations, such as behavior, rituals, jargon, and so on. Values include social principles, standards, beliefs, and
so on, which have intrinsic worth to the group. Assumptions include taken for granted beliefs. Schein’s model
indicates that the three layers are interdependent, with artifacts and values having a reciprocal causal relationship,
and values and assumptions having a reciprocal causal relationship. Because of the reciprocal relationships, it is
usually considered sufficient to observe artifacts (such as rituals) or analyze beliefs to characterize cultures.
In published research, empirical studies of culture, which attempt to characterize or measure dimensions of culture,
have done so by observing behaviors or by eliciting beliefs (which may include beliefs related to values or beliefs
related to assumptions) through questionnaires or interviews. For instance, Robey and Markus [1984] adopted a
cultural approach to understanding the information systems development (ISD) process by analyzing rituals. In other
words, they viewed the cultural process through the lens of the artifacts, since rituals are an observable form of
artifacts. In contrast, Iivari and Abrahamsson [2002] examined the cultural differences between managers, software
engineers, and user-centered design specialists by identifying their beliefs with respect to user-centered design
(UCD). Thus, although culture includes both visible manifestations (artifacts) and beliefs (values and assumptions),
a characterization of culture can be based on one or the other or both, regardless of the fact that the definition of
culture includes artifacts and the beliefs that constitute values and assumptions.
It should be noted that the term “belief” is used broadly in the literature on culture. This is best seen in this
hypothetical example. A respondent could say, “All men are created equal,” which can be seen as a statement of
value. Alternately, the respondent may say, “I believe ‘all men are created equal,’” which can be seen as a statement
of belief. But the two statements lead to the same characterization of culture. Thus, in efforts to characterize culture,
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the distinction between the terms such as “values” and “beliefs” are not critical. We use the term “belief” broadly to
include statements or responses about values, assumptions, ideas, morals, customs, and so on.

Professional Cultures
The culture of specific professions has long been a subject of study for organizational scholars (e.g., night watchmen
[Trice, 1993]; police [Van Maanen, 1973]). The existence of distinct cultural characteristics unique to individual
professions has been documented. For example, accountants view themselves as rationalists [Pondy, 1983] who
believe that the primary reality is a cold-blooded “bottom-line” [Trice and Beyer, 1993]. The culture of doctors is
rooted in the Hippocratic Oath, which emphasizes the primacy of ‘do no harm’ [Smith and Kleinman, 1989]. The
engineering culture in a high technology firm is described as being informal, where initiative and trust are important,
and “working for money as a prime motivator will be abhorred” [Kunda, 1995, p. 75]. These findings support the idea
that individuals who practice the same profession tend to band together into communities, draw their identities from
the work they do, and share a set of values, norms, and attitudes, all of which form a part of their occupational
culture [Van Maanen and Barley, 1984].
More research has found evidence supporting the existence of a distinct occupational culture among IS
professionals [Guzman et al., 2004; Guzman, Stam, and Stanton 2008; Rao and Ramachandran, 2011]. These
studies have shown that IS professionals have a converging cluster of characteristics, reflecting such attributes as
the technical nature of the occupation, the responsibilities of IS personnel associated with technology, and the use of
technical jargon. Managers view IS professionals as responsible for not only the technology, but also “to help serve
their staff so they can be the most efficient and productive, while at the same time protecting the organization from
outside threats” [Guzman et al., 2004, p. 79].
As mentioned earlier, differences in cultures across professions are often the source of differences in thinking,
reasoning, and priorities [Hansen, 1995], which can lead to conflicts and dysfunctions. For instance, Iivari and
Abrahamsson [2002] showed that managers believed that user-centered design (UCD) was theoretical and
complicated, software engineers considered UCD as unimportant, while UCD specialists considered it important and
useful. Rao and Ramachandran [2011] showed that IS personnel believed that technical jargon was essential for
precise communication, while managers believed that technical jargon just confused non-technical people. Such
differences in cultural beliefs can be readily seen to be potential sources of problems in the context of interactions
between professional groups. This brief review indicates that groups belonging to different professions can have
distinctly different beliefs, and such differences have the potential to cause dysfunctional interactions between the
groups. Consequently, our premise is that different professional groups are likely to have distinct beliefs that would
constitute distinct security cultures of their own. These differences need to be identified and understood to avoid
dysfunctions in the design and implementation of information security initiatives.

Security Culture
In this sub-section, we discuss the importance of security cultures, the diverse conceptualizations of security culture
in literature, and the efforts to identify the dimensions of culture. Lastly, we include a section on alternate
approaches to improve security-related behaviors.
The importance of security culture in the protection of information has been recognized for quite some time [e.g.,
Andress and Fonseca, 2000; Beynon, 2001; Breidenbach 2000; Schwarzwalder, 1999; Von Solms, 2000].
Proponents argue that the development of a security culture in organizations would influence employee behavior
over and beyond technological and managerial controls [Dhillon, 1995; Ruighaver et al., 2007; Vroom and Von
Solms, 2004]. It has been argued that company policies alone are not adequate to ensure appropriate security
behavior, but must manifest in a culture to produce the desired effects [Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004].
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that while culture is expected to have a significant effect on security, such
effect could be positive or negative [Vroom and Von Solms, 2004].
The acknowledgement of the importance of security culture has spawned a keen interest in research in this area.
Notwithstanding the high level of interest, the concept of security culture is still evolving. In some early studies,
security culture is left undefined [e.g., May, 2003]. In others, the definition is near circular. For instance, Gaunt
[2000, p. 152] views security culture in a health environment as “a culture in which personal health care information
is processed securely.” Still others [e.g., Knapp, Marshall, Rainer and Ford, 2006] measure security culture using
survey items, such as, “Employees value the importance of security” and “A culture exists that promotes good
security practices,” from which items the reader could infer the researchers’ conceptualization of security culture.
A sampling of the definitions of security culture suggests diversity in thinking. Dhillon [1997] defines security culture
as “the totality of patterns of behaviour [our italics] in an organization that contribute to the protection of information
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of all kinds.” Martins and Eloff [2002, p. 205] see information security culture “as a set of information security
characteristics. These characteristics such as integrity and availability of information [our italics]…. Information
security culture is also seen as an assumption [our italics] about what is and what is not acceptable in relation to
information security.” Helokunnas and Kuusisto [2003, p. 191] view security culture as “a system consisting of
interacting framework and content category components [our italics] of information security,” where content includes
“people attitude, motivation and knowledge including mental models about information security.” Others use
Schein’s three-layer model as the basis and include artifacts and creations, collective values, norms and knowledge,
basic assumptions and beliefs [e.g., Schlienger and Teufel, 2003]. Schlienger and Teufel use a questionnaire with
ten items, which are not specifically classified as values, norms, or beliefs. The diversity of characterizations of
security culture can be seen in these definitions. What is evident is that some researchers focus on behavior, while
others focus on values and beliefs. Each of these belongs in one of the layers of the Schein [1985] model for culture.
In other words, researchers base their definition and conceptualization of information security culture on the Schein
model, which was originally proposed for culture.
In the current study, we also view Schein’s model [Schein, 1985] as a basis for conceptualizing information security
culture (i.e., information systems culture includes behaviors, values, and assumptions/beliefs that inform on the topic
of security). Further, as we stated earlier, we use the term “belief” broadly to include all responses about knowledge,
ideas, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. Also, as we have shown, it is usually adequate to examine a single
aspect such as rituals or beliefs to characterize culture. In the current study, we will elicit beliefs from respondents in
interviews to characterize information security cultures of professionals.
Researchers who have delved a little deeper into conceptualizing security culture have drawn on two perspectives,
primarily in an effort to propose methods or frameworks to improve organizational security culture. The first
perspective is that of Schein [1985]. For example, Schlienger and Teufel [2003] attempt to assess the gap between
employee perceptions at all three levels and the actual state in an organization. They do not explain how they
arrived at the items that they use. Further, the items range from low level items, such as “Passwords should always
have a length of at least eight characters and contain at least two alphanumeric characters in the middle,” to high
level items such as, “Every employee should be trained in the information security controls he/she is supposed to
use in his/her work.”
Zakaria and Gani [2003] use the Schein model to create a checklist. They use elements underlying each of the three
layers and intuitively propose specific items of interest in information security. For instance, for the artifacts (surface
manifestations) layer, they consider the element, norms, and propose the item, “Never open any suspicious
attachment file of e-mail or always update antivirus databases online,” for the checklist. Effectively, the items on the
checklist reflect a do or don’t, which collectively are argued to improve security culture in an organization. The
process by which items are generated is not discussed.
Both articles [Schlienger and Teufel, 2003; Zakaria and Gani, 2003] are focused on enhancing information security
in organizations by detailing low level behaviors that employees should comply with (e.g., using passwords with
some characteristics or not opening suspicious attachments). Admittedly, these behaviors will improve information
security and help develop a stronger information security culture in organizations. However, they are not useful in
characterizing the information security culture of a group.
In the second perspective, researchers have attempted to identify dimensions of security culture [e.g., Chia,
Maynard and Ruighaver, 2002; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005] based on different theories. Chia et al. use Detert,
Schroeder, and Mauriel’s framework [Detert, Schroeder and Mauriel, 2000], and Tejay and Dhillon used Hall’s
classification of behavioral responses to the implementation of a new computer-based system in an organization
[Hall, 1959].
Chia et al. [2002] use the eight dimensions that Detert et al. [2000] proposed to characterize culture associated with
the success of total quality management in organizations. The eight dimensions are: (1) the basis of truth and
rationality, (2) the nature of time and time horizon, (3) motivation, (4) stability versus change/innovation/personal
growth, (5) orientation to work, task, co-workers, (6) isolation versus collaboration/cooperation, (7) control,
coordination, and responsibility, and (8) orientation and focus—internal and/or external. Chia et al. [2002] adapted
these for the context of information security culture in organizations. Thus, for example, under the category of the
basis of truth and rationality, they examine employee beliefs about the truth and rationality of what information
security is and the importance of information security.
A point to note is that the dimensions are not completely orthogonal, and instances of partial overlap can be
identified. For example, under the dimension orientation to work, task, and co-workers, the authors include one
statement that “employees should be made to feel responsible for security in the organizations,” and under the
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dimension isolation versus collaboration/cooperation, they include that, “Every member of an organization should be
involved in some way with maintaining security.” There is little, if any, distinction between the two statements, so this
is a point of overlap between the two dimensions. There are other elements to each dimension that are different
from each other. For example, the first dimension states that education of employees about security is important,
while the second dimension emphasizes the importance of including all employees in the development of security
policies.
Chia et al. [2002] developed a qualitative comparison of two organizations along these dimensions. Their results
indicate differences between the two organizations on several of the dimensions. For instance, organization A
believed security to be very important, adopted a longer-term view, and had strict security policies in place. In
contrast, organization B believed security to be less important, adopted a shorter-term view, and did not have strong
security policies in place. In sum, the framework is useful in characterizing and comparing information security
cultures of organizations.
Tejay and Dhillon [2005] base their development of dimensions on Hall’s [Hall, 1959] classification of behavioral
responses to the implementation of a new computer-based system in an organization. The responses or behavioral
patterns are referred to as silent messages. Following Dhillon’s [1995] examination of the implications of the silent
messages for information security, Tejay and Dhillon [2005] have developed these further to propose dimensions for
information systems culture. The seven constructs that they have proposed are group cohesiveness, professional
codes, informal work practice, empowerment, planning, information security awareness, and organizational
structure. Tejay and Dhillon [2005] have developed multi-item scales for each dimension and argue that the
dimensions are useful in assessing the information security culture of an organization.
There are some issues worthy of note. First, both frameworks are focused on information security culture in
organizations. Second, they are both prescriptive in nature (i.e., trying to suggest ways in which information security
culture in organizations can be strengthened). For instance, Chia et al. [2002] indicate that “Employees should [our
italics] …” in some of their statements, implying prescriptive suggestions. An example from Tejay and Dhillon [2005]
would be their hypothesis “Lack of planning would have impact on information security culture of an organization,”
implying prescriptively that planning is necessary. Lastly, there are overlapping aspects to the points underlying both
sets of dimensions. The overlaps are not relevant to the current study, so they are not discussed further.
Based on our literature review of the information security culture, we believe that research in the area is still at an
early stage. Our review points to three significant issues. First, the concept of security culture draws on the concepts
developed for culture in general (e.g., Schein’s model). Second, diverse approaches are being used to assess
information security culture. Third, security culture has been studied in an organizational context and viewed from an
integrated perspective (i.e., security culture is seen as uniform throughout the organization, with minor exceptions).
An example of the exception would be the study by Ruighaver et al. [2007], who examine the differences in security
beliefs of IT managers and end-users [Ruighaver et al., 2007]. No study exists that examines differences in security
cultures across professions.
In the next sub-section, we briefly discuss alternate approaches to improve security-related behaviors.

Alternate Approaches to Improve Security-Related Behaviors
The development of security culture is one approach to improving security-related behaviors. Other approaches are
possible. Published literature on alternate approaches includes both descriptive and prescriptive studies. Descriptive
studies focus on identifying factors that influence security-related behaviors, while prescriptive studies propose and
test methods to improve security-related behaviors. For instance, descriptive studies have shown that social
influence [e.g., Herath and Rao, 2010; Johnston and Warkentin, 2010; Lee and Larsen, 2009], self-efficacy [e.g.,
Bulgurcu, Cavasoglu and Benbasat, 2010], perceived threat characteristics (e.g., threat severity [Johnston and
Warkentin, 2010], and threat appraisal [Lee and Larsen, 2009]), neutralization [Siponen and Vance, 2010],
awareness [Bulgurcu et al., 2010], and so on, influence attitudes and intentions to comply with security policies.
It is possible to infer prescriptive measures from the descriptive studies. For instance, the finding that awareness
increases compliance suggests that organizations should implement initiatives to increase awareness of securityrelated issues among employees. Prescriptive studies recommend mandatory compliance [Boss, Kirsch,
Angermeier, Shingler and Boss, 2009; Kwon and Johnson, 2011; Smith, Winchester, Bunker and Jamieson, 2010],
deterrence [D’Arcy and Herath, 2011], fear appeals [Johnston and Warkentin, 2010], training [e.g., Puhakainen and
Siponen, 2010], user participation [Spears and Barki, 2010], and so on.
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The long list of explanatory factors is overwhelming initially, but a deeper examination shows two points. First, the
prescriptive factors tend to work over different temporal frames. Second, the factors, while distinct in some ways,
have overlapping characteristics. Each of these points is discussed next.
Viewing the factors from the temporal frame, prescriptive methods to improve security-related behaviors can be
classified as short term or medium term. Mandatory compliance may seem to be the method with the most potential
for effecting immediate changes in the short term. Monitoring [Boss et al., 2009] and auditing [Kwon and Johnson,
2011] enhance the perception that compliance is mandatory, and thereby improve adherence to security-related
rules, policies, and procedures. Boss et al. [2009] report that mandatory compliance rules lead to actual compliance,
but Smith et al. [2010] report that only 33 percent of organizations complied with mandatory policies. It is interesting
to note that Kwon and Johnson [2011] did not find a correlation between compliance and security performance.
Further, mandatory compliance programs include deterrence to motivate employees to observe rules. The
effectiveness of deterrence remains to be established conclusively. A review published by D’Arcy and Herath [2011]
shows that deterrence is not uniformly effective across published studies. Thus, it would appear that short-term
initiatives may need to be supplemented with medium and longer term initiatives.
Medium-term initiatives include fear appeals [Johnston and Warkentin, 2010], user participation [Spears and Barki,
2010], training [e.g., Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010], and similar measures. Results from such initiatives have been
mixed. Johnston and Warkentin [2010] have shown that fear appeals can influence behavioral intentions to comply
with security requirements, but the effect is not uniform across all end-users. Spears and Barki [2010] have shown
that user participation in the formulation of legally mandated compliance programs leads to greater awareness of
security, better alignment of security management to the business environment, and improved control processes for
ensuring security. Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] report the effective implementation of training programs based on
two theories—the universal constructive instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model. Key findings of the
study were that it was necessary to stimulate cognitive processing of material presented during training sessions,
and a continuous communication process is needed to improve compliance. In examining the medium-term
initiatives, it may be observed that the primary focus of each of these initiatives is different, but there are some
overlapping aspects between them. For instance, training can be a forum to communicate three elements of a fear
appeal—severity, susceptibility, and the appropriate response to a security incident—and to provide the employee
with the fourth element of the fear appeal (i.e., the ability to perform the recommended response). Also, one goal of
training is to increase awareness. User participation in formulating policies also serves to increase awareness.
Even as the medium-term initiatives have different foci, but share some commonalities, security culture, while
distinct from these medium-term initiatives, also shares some commonalities with them. A comparison of security
culture to each of the alternate approaches is possible. As an exemplar, we will compare security culture to one
alternate factor, security awareness, to highlight commonalities and differences.
Schein’s model [Schein, 1985] of security culture includes values, norms, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. There are
different ways to develop or change culture. They include setting examples by senior executives [e.g., Leach, 2003],
education [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004], and so on. In particular, it is generally accepted that culture is
built over a longer period of time and is deeply ingrained. Awareness, on the other hand, is typically defined as “the
extent to which organizational members understand the importance of information security; the level of security
required by the organization and their individual security responsibilities” [Albrechtsen, 2007, p. 280]. Education and
repeated reminders are seen as the primary ways to raise and maintain awareness [e.g., Thompson and Von Solms,
1998].
The overlap between the two terms is that education is seen as a means to develop strong security culture and
increase security awareness. Security awareness is seen as a contributor to the development of security culture [Da
Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Lim, Ahmad, Chang and Maynard, 2010]. The distinction between the two terms is that high
awareness does not necessarily equate to strong culture. Groups may be highly aware of security-related issues but
choose not to comply with security requirements for various reasons. By definition, the lack of compliance implies
weak security culture. Thus, it is possible to have high security awareness but weak security culture.
In sum, the literature review emphasizes the complexity of the culture construct, as well as the importance of
examining differences in professional cultures and diverse aspects of information security culture. In the section on
information security culture, current thinking about the importance of security culture is mentioned, definitions are
examined, and the existing frameworks to study security culture in organizations are articulated. Lastly, we provide a
brief overview of the various factors discussed in the security literature to explain security-related behaviors, and
various methods suggested to enhance the behaviors; this overview also includes an exemplar comparison of
security culture and security awareness, to illustrate the overlapping and distinguishing characteristics of that
security culture from other initiatives.
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the current study, our goal is to characterize the information security cultures of different professions, and
examine the differences across them. Information security cultures of professions is an understudied phenomenon.
For this reason, we elected to conduct a qualitative study (i.e., conduct interviews of professionals from selected
professional groups to develop a descriptive characterization of the information security cultures of their respective
professions). Miles and Huberman [1994] categorize qualitative studies as tight or loose, and discuss the trade-offs
between them. They refer to tight designs as those that use a preexisting conceptual framework, and to loose
designs as those in which the conceptual framework emerges during the course of the study. They recommend
loose designs for understudied phenomena. They also recognize that even in loose designs the researcher comes
to the study with some orienting ideas. Eisenhardt [1989] recommends that some a priori description of
conceptualizations, constructs, and dimensions can help develop a study’s initial design.
In the current situation, there is no preexisting conceptual framework for the study of information security cultures of
professional groups. However, there are frameworks proposed by Chia et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005] for
the study of information security cultures in organizations. These frameworks are not directly applicable in their
original formulation for two reasons: (1) the frameworks are for information security cultures of organizations, while
our interest is on the information security cultures of professions (the examination of information security cultures at
the level of the profession), and (2) the frameworks are prescriptive in nature, while our interest is in developing
descriptions of the information security cultures of the different professions. Nonetheless, the two frameworks
contain features that can help in formulating a starting point for our study.
The two frameworks have been used to generate issues to address in the characterization of information security
culture (see Tables 2 and 3). The process followed to arrive at the issues is as follows. The points discussed by Chia
et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005] under each of their respective dimensions were first listed. The points are
shown in the tables. If we considered them useful in identifying issues relevant to the information security cultures of
professionals, then appropriate issues were noted. If a dimension was focused on an organizational aspect, and did
not include any points that were useful for characterizing information security cultures of professionals, then it was
excluded. For instance, Tejay and Dhillon [2005] include planning as a dimension based on the logic that planning
was important to improving the information security culture of organizations. Planning does not help in
understanding or describing the information security culture of professional groups. So, no issue is derived from this
dimension. The reasons for excluding other dimensions are indicated in Tables 2 and 3.
In effect, by the Miles and Huberman [1994] discussion of tight and loose designs, our approach falls between the
two extremes. In the absence of preexisting frameworks for characterizing the information security culture of
professionals, we have adapted previous frameworks for the information security culture of organizations to
generate issues relevant to characterizing the information security culture of professionals. The process of
generating the issues and the subsequent questions for the interviews is loosely guided by the adapted frameworks
and is researcher-driven. As Miles and Huberman [1994] put it, “. . . as researchers, we do have some background
knowledge. … We know some questions to ask, … Not to ‘lead’ with our conceptual strength can be simply selfdefeating” [p. 17]. In keeping with this theme, we use our intuition and common sense to generate the questions.
In reviewing the issues generated, it was clear that almost all issues focused on the information security-related
beliefs of the professional groups. So, we created a category called security-related beliefs. Only two issues did not
fit neatly into the category of security-related beliefs: beliefs about willingness to take risks in general, and beliefs
about professional codes. Since these two issues were quite disparate, we created two separate categories: general
beliefs and professional identity beliefs. General beliefs include beliefs about risk and compliance, and professional
identity beliefs subsume issues related to professional codes. There are two reasons why we have included these
two categories in the overall conceptualization of the information security culture of professionals. First, the issues
related to these categories are derived from prior conceptualizations of information security culture. In the interest of
building on prior research, they should be retained in the conceptualization of the information security cultures of
professionals.
Second, while each of the two categories is not limited to security, they do encompass security and can inform us on
the issue of information security culture. For instance, the unwillingness to take risks is likely to manifest in a
tendency to comply with rules and regulations. It is reasonable to argue that groups that are risk averse are likely to
carry over that aversion to the area of information security, and comply with rules and regulations regarding security,
resulting in a stronger security culture in the group.
When we consider professional codes, the codes incorporate the profession’s core values. The core values in turn
are rooted in the profession’s perception of who they are, what their role is, and their value to organizations.
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Table 2: Identification of Issues for Interview Guides
Chia et al. [2002]
Listing of preliminary issues to develop interview questions
The nature of time and time horizon
This relates to how organizations should view security to improve
the information security culture in organizations. This is not
 Short-term vs. long-term
relevant to characterizing security cultures of professional
perspective of security
groups.
Motivation
This relates to how organizations should motivate employees to
improve the information security culture in organizations. This is
 Are employees intrinsically
not relevant to characterizing the security cultures of professional
motivated to accept security?
groups.
 Rewards and punishment?
Stability versus change/innovation/
We have split this into two: Limited it to members of profession
personal growth
(compares to employees in organization)
 Stability is safe; change has risks
 Beliefs about risks in general
 Willingness to take risks
 Beliefs about security risks
 Willingness to take security risks
 Their propensity to take security risks under performance
pressure

Orientation to work, task, co-workers:
 Employees should be made to feel
responsible for security.
 Is security an impediment to the
daily operations of an employee?
 Education of employees about
security is important.
Isolation versus collaboration/cooperation
 Every member of an organization
should be involved in some way
with maintaining security.
 Security policy should be created
collaboratively.
Control, coordination, and responsibility
 Balance between risk and control:
empowerment versus enforcement
 Alignment of organizational and
security goals
 Tone for security must be set from
the top
 Security awareness should be
instigated right from the top
 Need for security team
Orientation and focus
The internal and external focus driving the
security activities
The basis of truth and rationality
 Importance of security?
 What is good/bad security?
 What is the effectiveness of
security?

Risks are generally controlled by formulating rules and
procedures or having direct guidance from management. Beliefs
regarding these are related to beliefs about risk:
 Beliefs about complying with rules and procedures
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and complying
with managerial guidance
 What is the role of the professional in security?
 What conflicts exist between work and security?
 What are sources of information about security?




Who is responsible for information security?
What role does the professional group play in ensuring
information security?

Some issues in this category are not relevant to professions. For
example, alignment of organizational and security goals is an
organizational issue.
Other issues lead to possible questions:
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and complying
with managerial guidance
 Who is responsible for security?

In organizations, there may be external forces dictating security
behavior. This is not relevant to characterizing security cultures
of professional groups.
 What is security?
 What is the importance of security?
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Table 3: Identification of Issues for Interview Guides
Tejay and Dhillon [2005]
Listing of preliminary issues to develop interview questions
Planning
This is a prescription to improve information security
culture in organizations. It does not relate to security
 Security requirements should be
beliefs of professional groups.
analyzed.
Organizational structure
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and
 Order of elements in an organization
complying with managerial guidance
(hierarchical structure)
 Assigns authority and responsibilities
Information security awareness
 What is security?
 Awareness of security policies,
 What is the importance of security?
procedures, controls; role of employee
 Who is responsible for security?
 Attained through education and training
 What are sources of knowledge about security?
Informal work practice
 What are conflicts between security and work
 Daily operations of how things are done
performance?
Empowerment
 What is the responsibility of the profession for
security?
 Power
 Responsibility (personal accountability)
 Authority
Professional codes
 Core value of profession
Ethics
 Role of profession
Codes of conduct
 Contribution to organization/society
Group cohesiveness
This relates to improving the information security culture in
organizations by increasing cohesiveness of working
 Threatening group cohesiveness will
groups in organizations. So this is not relevant to
threaten security culture.
characterizing security cultures of the professional context.
Collectively, the core values of the profession, as well as the perception held by members of the profession of who
they are, what their role is, and their value to the organization, reflect the beliefs about the identity of the professional
group. It can be seen that these perceptions can shed light on security-related beliefs. For example, a group that
sees its role as maintaining the integrity of organizations may pay more attention to security-related issues than a
group that sees its role as improving the innovativeness of organizations.
In sum, the issues that have been identified to help characterize information security cultures of professionals can be
parsimoniously classified into three categories: beliefs about the identity of the profession, general beliefs about risk
taking and compliance, and beliefs about security. Each of the issues being considered to characterize security
culture of professional groups can be included in one of these three categories. So, no additional category is
necessary. Our framework contains the key dimensions applicable to professional security culture from both prior
conceptualizations.

IV. METHODOLOGY
Our qualitative study is based on interviews of respondents from different professions on issues identified in the
section on theoretical framework as relevant to the characterization of information security cultures of professions. In
this section, we elaborate on the demographics of the respondents in our study, the data collection process, and
finally explain the analytical procedures used.

Respondents
Our goal was to characterize the information security cultures of different professions and compare them. We
elected to study four professions, because that number seemed sufficiently large to afford us an opportunity to
detect diversity in security cultures, while at the same time keeping the scope of the study to a manageable size.
The accounting profession was chosen because its work requires compliance with specific rules and policies, such
as those specified by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Additionally, accounting data includes confidential organizational and client information, and must therefore be
handled securely. The human relations (HR) profession was chosen because it has the primary responsibility for
handling confidential employee information, which is subject to various laws, such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The marketing profession was chosen because of the general perception that marketers
are relatively less likely to be concerned about information security. For example, Puhakainen and Siponen [2010]
conducted an action research study in an organization to improve employee compliance through information
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systems security training. In assessing the effectiveness of the training initiative, the researchers recorded “four
issues that still needed to be addressed,” of which the first one was “The sales team [our italics] in particular still took
advantage of the permitted exceptions to e-mail encryption” [p, 770]. Such a finding is an exemplar of the relatively
lower level of concern about information security among marketing personnel. The information systems profession
was chosen because of the general perception that it is responsible for information security.
Respondents were recruited on the basis of their current full time work experience or prior full time work experience
in their respective professions. At the time of data gathering, they were enrolled as graduate students at a large
public university in the United States of America. Demographics of the respondent pools for each profession are
shown in Table 4. The respondents for each profession were from different organizations. Thus, any cultural
commonality that is identified can be attributed more to professional influences than to organizational influences.

No. of respondents
Male:female ratio
Age range (years)
Experience (years)
Job titles (examples)

Association with
profession

Table 4: Demographics of Respondents
IS professionals
Marketing
HR professionals
professionals
12
7
7
4:1
5:2
1:6
23–45
21–43
24–37
2–25
1.5–20
1–14
Programmers,
Marketing research
HR representative,
network admin.,
analyst, retailer,
compensation
database admin.,
marketing assistant,
analyst, recruiter.
Web developers.
property manager.
Members of IS
Attended professional Members of HR
professional
conferences, referred professional
associations like
to professional
associations like
ACM, ISSA, ISC2,
websites and forums, SHRM, AMA-HR,
and so on, and
constantly interacted
Society of Training &
attended
with members of their Development, and
professional
profession.
so on, and attended
conferences.
professional
conferences.

Accounting
professionals
11
3:8
22–55
3 months–30
Staff accountant, tax
accountant, auditor,
public accountant.
Members of
accounting
professional
associations like AAA,
attended professional
conferences, and
referred to
professional websites.

Data Collection
The data collection method used in the current study was semi-structured, face-to-face interviews to elicit the beliefs
underlying the information security culture. As we have mentioned earlier, we use the term “beliefs” broadly to refer
to responses on values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on; based on prior research, these are usually considered
sufficient to characterize culture. The structured questions were generated based on the issues related to the
categories identified in the theoretical framework (see Tables 2 and 3 for issues on which interview questions are
based). A detailed interview guide (see Appendix A) was prepared. The guide consists of questions for inclusion
during the interview. In some cases, the issue listed in the table is already in the form of a question. In other cases,
the issue was expanded into more than one question in the interview guide.
The follow-up unstructured questions were aimed at eliciting clarifications, details, and richness. Responses from
interviewees were not limited in any way. The interviews focused on identifying the following three sets of beliefs—
beliefs about their identity of the profession, general beliefs, and beliefs about information security. Respondents
were asked questions only about their profession (e.g., accountants were asked about the beliefs of the accounting
profession only). A sample of the questions used in the study is shown in Table 5.
The unit of analysis for the study is the professional group level, so the respondents were asked to state their
respective professional group’s beliefs and behaviors, not their own personal beliefs and behaviors. Toward the end
of the interviews, respondents were allowed to also ask questions and add comments.
The interviews were conducted over a period of three months. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition
to the transcription, additional notes were taken during the course of the interview and were also made after the
interview. Following every interview, the recordings were reviewed to ensure proper preparation for subsequent
interviews.
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Category
Membership in profession

Identity:
Core value of profession
Role of profession
Contribution to organization/
society
General beliefs:
Beliefs about risks

Table 5: Sample Questions Used in Interviews
2
Sample questions
What profession do you consider yourself to be a part of?
To what extent do you participate in activities or groups associated with your
profession?
Do you attend professional group meetings, gatherings, or conferences?
What would your profession’s members say the values of your profession
are?
What do members of your profession believe is the primary role of their
profession?
If you had to describe what your profession contributes to society, what
would you say?

Generally speaking, how do members of your profession feel toward risktaking?
Beliefs about complying with rules Among the members of your profession, what is the general belief about
and procedures
abiding by rules and procedures?
Beliefs about organizational
Do members of your profession subscribe to the idea of hierarchy?
hierarchy and complying with
What would the response of members of your profession be if upper
managerial guidance
management tried to specify details on how to do the task?
Beliefs about information security:
What is information security?
Can you describe what the term “information security” or “IS security”
means to members of your profession?
Who is responsible for information Who do the members of your profession think should be responsible for
security?
information security?
What role does group play in
What role do the members of your profession think they play with respect to
ensuring security?
information security?
Beliefs about taking security risks Do members of your profession believe in taking information security-related
risks?
Beliefs about taking security risks How do members of your profession handle choices/trade-offs between
under performance pressure
getting the job done and information security measures?
It would be appropriate to mention that a pilot study with twelve respondents from diverse professions was
conducted. Pilot studies help the researchers get familiar with the phenomenon of interest and test the questions.
The pilot study indicated no major problem with the interview scheme.

Analytical Procedures
The interviews were transcribed, identifying information removed and coded. The Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA)
software Atlas.ti was used to code the transcripts. A total of thirty-nine codes were generated. A sample of the codes
3
is shown in Table 6. In qualitative studies, coding is part of the analysis process—“coding is analysis” [Miles and
Huberman, 1994, p. 56]. Thus, the first author was the primary coder. To ensure the reliability of the coding process,
we followed procedures used in Pare [1995]. An external coder is provided with a list of codes, an explanation of
each code, and a sample chunk for each code. The external coder is instructed to use the list to become familiar
with the codes. Then the external coder is provided with a test set of textual chunks from the interviews. The
external coder and the researcher code these chunks independent of each other. Intercoder reliability is calculated
using Holsti’s code of reliability (CR) [Holsti, 1969]. The formula for calculating the coefficient of reliability is CR =
2M/(N1 + N2), where M = number of coding decisions on which the coders agreed, and N1 and N2 are the number
of coding decisions made by the first and second coders, respectively. The coefficient of reliability for the test set
was 0.83. The external coder and the researcher discussed the codes on which the two disagreed. On the basis of
the discussion, the researcher was able to confirm his understanding of the code or correct his understanding of the
code for further coding of the remaining transcripts. Inter-rater reliability was checked only once. It can also be seen
that the inter-rater reliability was done for the overall coding scheme and not for individual codes.

2
3

The full list of questions is included in Appendix A.
The full set of codes with number of instances and sample segments are shown in Appendix B.
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Table 6: Sample of Codes
Description of individual codes
Codes
Beliefs about taking risks
Bel_Risk
Beliefs about complying with hierarchy in organizations
Bel_Comp_Hier
Beliefs about complying with rules and procedures
Bel_Comply_Rules
Beliefs about amount of responsibility generally preferred
Bel_Pref_Responsibility
Beliefs about taking information security risks
Bel_InfoSec_Risks
Beliefs about taking information security risks, when taking such risks could
Bel_InfoSec_Risk_Job_Done
help them in getting their jobs done and improve their efficiency or productivity.
Beliefs about amount of responsibility preferred on information security issues Bel_Pref_InfoSec_Responsibility
Beliefs about the role members of their profession play in information security
Bel_Role_in_InfoSec
issues in
Beliefs
about
organizations
who is responsible for information security issues in organization Bel_InfoSec_Responsibility_is
Beliefs about the connection between information security and productivity
Bel_InfoSec_Prod_Cnx
issues
Next, the process of generating a narrative is described. The software package (Atlas.ti) was used to extract clusters
of quotes associated with one code from the interview transcripts. Sample responses for one cluster, “Who do IT
professionals think is responsible for information security in an organization?” are shown in Table 7. Brief notes are
made, and a summary of beliefs surfacing from the responses are noted. In Table 8, the development of a small part
of the narrative from the summaries associated with three different codes is shown. A preliminary structure for a
narrative fragment that could be generated from these summaries was first decided upon. Then the actual narrative
fragment was developed. Using this process, the narrative shown in the results section was developed.
Table 7: Sample Responses and Summary Notes for One Code
Sample of responses and summary notes: Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security in
an organization? (Code: Bel_InfoSec_Responsibility_is)
Question
Response
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P3: IT professionals
information security within organizations?
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P4: IT professionals
information security within organizations?
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P5: Everybody
information security within organizations?
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P6: Themselves [IT professionals]
information security within organizations?
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P7: CIO at the very end. But, it comes down to IT
information security within organizations?
professionals themselves including the security staff
and IT professionals that you have.
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for
P11: The trend today is that you have an actual
information security within organizations?
security team.
What if they don’t have an actual one?
P11: Whoever they happen to have working in IT, if
they don’t have a security team. But, most large
organizations have a security team.
Notes for “Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security within organizations?”
Keywords/phrases
Individuals mentioned: IT professionals; security
teams; CIO; everybody.
Summary
The primary belief is that IT professionals are
responsible for security. A couple of respondents
believed that the security team should be responsible.
One or two respondents stated that management or
the CIO is ultimately responsible for security. Only
one respondent viewed information security as
everyone’s responsibility.
The narratives generated following this systematic process are used to create segments of the descriptive
characterization of the information security cultures of the four professions. The descriptions are presented in the
next section on results. The empirical basis or empirical support for the descriptions are the narratives generated.
The quotes included are exemplars to illustrate issues, and are not meant to be the sole basis on which the
descriptions are developed.
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Table 8: Generation of Narrative from Summaries
Development of narrative from summary notes for multiple codes
Notes for “Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security within organizations?”
Individuals mentioned
IT professionals, security teams, CIO, everybody
Summary
The primary belief is that IT professionals are responsible for security. A couple of
respondents believed that the security team should be responsible. One or two
respondents stated that management or the CIO is ultimately responsible for
security. Only one respondent viewed information security as everyone’s
responsibility.
Notes for “What does the term ‘information security’ mean for IT professionals?”
Key phrases from
Protecting data, keeping it from going public, protection from hackers. Making sure
responses
data is not tampered with.
Protecting technology resources: network, infrastructure, networks, computer
systems, and applications.
Securing lines of transmission
Summary
IT professionals view information security as protecting data and the technology
resources, which include: computers, networks, and applications.
Notes for “What activities/issues do IT professionals associate with information security?”
Keywords/phrases from
Planning, passwords, encryption, rules and procedures, audits.
responses
Passwords, physical security, authorized access.
Intrusion detection, role-based access, passwords; confidentiality, integrity,
availability.
Summary
IT professionals associate technical issues and activities with information security,
such as intrusion detection, passwords, encryption, and role-based access. They
acknowledge the need for higher level managerial activities, such as planning, and
development of rules and procedures to guide the technical activities.
Preliminary structure for
IS professionals view information security as protection of information and
narrative
information infrastructure. Activities associated with information security—
passwords, encryption, and so on, as well as planning and development of rules
and policies. They view themselves as responsible for security.
Narrative generated from
IS professionals view information security primarily in terms of safeguarding the
4
these summaries
information residing in the information technology infrastructure, which includes the
computers, networks, and the software applications. Some of the tools that they
associate with information security include passwords, intrusion detection systems,
firewalls, and role-based access control systems. Thus, it would appear that they
view information security primarily as a technical problem. This, presumably, leads
to the belief that the IS group is and should be the group responsible for information
security in organizations. They believe that members of other professional groups,
such as accounting, marketing and human relations, view IS professionals as
responsible for security, a charge that they feel capable of fulfilling. IS professionals
further believe that while management may have the ultimate responsibility for
security, it is the responsibility of the IS group to guide management on security
issues, both by educating managers and by proposing security initiatives. They also
believe that they are responsible for developing security policies and implementing
them. Further, IS professionals believe that they are aware of security issues (i.e.,
what the dangers are and how to minimize them).

V. RESULTS
Our focus was on identifying and examining the security cultures of different professions. This section examines the
identities, general beliefs, and security-related beliefs of each of the four different professional groups. This is
followed by a brief comparison of the information security cultures of the four professional groups. The information
security culture of a group is viewed as the security-related beliefs taken in conjunction with the group’s beliefs about
its identity and its general beliefs about risk and compliance.

Identities of Professions
The identity of a professional group is its perception of itself, formed from its core values, and its perception of the
profession’s contribution to society and organizations. In our study, the core values of the different groups have
4

This narrative is part of the description of the Security Beliefs of IS Professionals in the body of the article.

Volume 33
176

Article 11

common threads, including honesty, integrity, and service to the organization and society. However, each group’s
perception of its role within an organization is quite distinct. The role is embodied in their belief that they bridge the
organization and another entity, that entity being related to their special area of expertise.
Identity of Accounting Professionals
Accountants believe that their role is to ensure the validity and accuracy of financial statements of organizations, and
to keep track of money and other assets in organizations. They view themselves as the bridge between principals
(the shareholders) and agents (the managers). To quote one respondent:
“They [accounting professionals] are the people that assure the correctness of financial statements.
They are the people that say the financial statements are correct. They play a big role between the
principals which are shareholders and the agents which are the managers. They are the middle
man between them i.e. to make sure that this is your money and this is what is being done with
your money.”
Accountants further believe that their work contributes to the efficiency and profitability of organizations. The
accounting and financial reports that they produce are used to assist the organizations in making decisions on
budget allocations, predicting future performance, and ensuring compliance with regulations. Valid accounting data
leads to good decisions, which in turn lead to efficiency and profitability. In the words of one respondent:
“Because that [financial reports] is what all the other departments will utilize when making decisions
about the firm, if they should invest in the project or discontinue a line.”
Accounting professionals believe that they play an integral part in the protection of the wealth of people in society.
When queried about the contribution that accountants make to society, one of the respondents with three decades of
experience in the profession put it this way:
“Sort of like ‘A guard at the door’. We [accounting professionals] offer an area of security,
confidence to the users of the financial information. Accountants are a form of security to the users
of financial information.”
Accounting scandals have reinforced the belief that there is a need to uphold their core values even in the event of
conflict with management. They believe that the emphasis on core accounting values is higher today than before the
notable corporate accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) when corporate values clouded the accounting
profession’s values of integrity and accuracy. Respondents noted that corporate accounting scandals have resulted
in regulatory standards and penalties for not upholding the values of the profession.
Identity of HR Professionals
HR professionals mediate the relationship between the organization and its employees. On one hand, they believe
they maximized the value of the organization by aligning employees with the strategic direction of the organization.
"[the core value of HR professionals is] to achieve the strategic objectives of the organization
through the accomplishments of people and so, the alliance would be first with strategic intent, and,
then aligning the people vertically and horizontally with what direction the company wants to go."
They provide support to the strategic goals of the organization by playing an active role in the recruitment,
development, and retention of employees.
“Developing people, celebrating their success and working with them to improve their
shortcomings.”
On the other hand, they view themselves as champions of the employees, ensuring equal treatment of all
employees, and advocating for their causes, which sometimes involve standing up to management on behalf of
employees. One HR manager said:
“You know we always have to fight different things for employees and managers. That fight means
bringing up the issues to the management, providing support, going outside and doing research
and saying this is why we have to do this.”
They also viewed their role as ensuring that the organization complied with federal and state laws and internal
policies.
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While professing that the core values are very important to them, HR professionals were clear on how they would
respond to a conflict between the values of their profession and the values of the organization. For issues related to
legal procedures and laws, they would stand up for the values of the profession, even when doing so may entail their
job. However, for other issues, they would concede to management. In the words of one recruiter:
“They [HR professionals] are going to go with the values of the organization. Because, that gives
them their bread and butter. Unless against the law that would be an exception.”
In effect, HR professionals view themselves as the mediators between an organization and its employees, trying to
help the organization gain the maximum from its employees, while simultaneously ensuring that employee rights and
privileges are not ignored.
Identity of Marketing Professionals
Marketing professionals view themselves as the group that bridges an organization and its customers. They believe
that they provide value by enabling organizations to understand the market and the customers, and by effectively
disseminating information about the organizations’ products to the market. To quote one marketing research analyst
on the issue of helping organizations understand customers,
“They [marketing professionals] play a major role overall in the organization because, if the
organization did not know who their customer is then they wouldn’t know what to sell.”
Marketing professionals believe that they play the critical role of bringing information about products to those who
need it (including organizations and consumers) and of enabling them to make informed decisions about the
products. In the words of one of the respondents with sales and advertising experience from the pharmaceutical
industry:
“..it [marketing profession] brings information to consumers that otherwise may not have been
conveyed. Because, marketing basically brings out information to those who need it about new
products.”
They view this role as important because they believe that society as a whole lacks the ability to pursue relevant
information about products and services available, because of information overload.
Thus, the marketing professionals have the identity of meeting societal needs for products by informing the
organization of the consumer needs and the consumer of products available from the organization.
Identity of IS Professionals
IS professionals view information systems as a key factor in making organizations more efficient and effective. They
view their role as helping organizations and society derive the benefits of using information technology. In this role,
they believe that it is their charge to develop and maintain the technical infrastructure and solve user problems. The
solutions to the complex problems associated with these tasks demand that IS professionals be innovative. Thus,
their primary identity is that of an innovative group dedicated to the task of making society and organizations more
efficient and effective through the use of information technology. An illustrative quote:
“[Information Systems] Delivers the infrastructure that our culture or society has grown to depend
upon. If you removed all the technology it will be back to Stone Age exactly. So, as a society we
have grown to depend on the technology. The IT [information technology] professionals themselves
are the ones that continue to develop and implement that technology. Quality of living ultimately
depends on IT professionals who continue to keep up our quality of living.”
While they see themselves as the primary personnel who are experts in the realm of technology, they recognize
their role has to be relevant to organizations. In this context, they encounter conflicts between their views and that of
other groups, either users or managers. In such situations of conflict, they are reluctant to surrender technologyrelated decisions to others. They will assert their viewpoints, almost to the point of appearing recalcitrant. But they
recognize that managers bear the ultimate responsibility for the well being of the organization. Hence, once they
believe that the managers have heard and taken their views about technology into consideration, they will concede
to managers. In short, when there are conflicts between the values of the IS personnel and those of the
organization, IS personnel will ultimately fall in line with organizational values. To quote one respondent:
“I would say that the values of the organization win over. Because its [IT professional’s] whole goal
is to support the overall organization. So, I would say IT would have to bow down to organization.”
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In effect, IS professionals view themselves as the technical experts who help an organization realize the benefits of
technology.
Summary of Identity of Professions
The interviews indicate that members of the Accounting and HR professions are focused on control functions.
Accountants are bound by the rules governing accounting practices, and they exert control over others by
demanding behavioral compliance with the rules. Similarly, HR professionals are bound by rules and regulations
from federal and state agencies, and they exert control over the other groups in the organization by demanding
compliance with employee-related regulations. In contrast, IS and marketing professionals identify more with
productivity responsibilities. IS professionals view their role as increasing organizational efficiency and effectiveness
by leveraging information systems and technology. Marketing professionals view their role as facilitating two-way
traffic between the organization and its customers, engaging in activities that increase sales and profitability.

General Beliefs of Professions
The general beliefs of interest to us are beliefs of professionals about risk, compliance with rules and procedures,
and the importance or relevance of hierarchy and managerial guidance. We consider these relevant because groups
with a proclivity toward risk-taking are also likely to take chances with security. Similarly, security safeguards are
enhanced by formulating policies and procedures that employees must observe. A group that fails to observe rules
and regulations, in general, may be more likely to transgress rules and regulations related to security. Finally, beliefs
about hierarchy and managerial guidance provide a basis for expectations regarding how groups may react to
security-related managerial initiatives.
General Beliefs of Accounting and HR Professionals
The general beliefs of the accounting professionals and HR professionals are very similar, so they are discussed
together. Both professions are rooted in rules and regulations. In the accounting profession, the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) provide the framework for preparing financial statements. Professional associations
such as the American Accounting Association (AAA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) have published codes of ethics. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has further defined expectations of
accounting professionals. Collectively, the internal standards, code of ethics, and laws governing accounting place a
strong demand on accounting professionals to comply with rules and regulations.
5

Accounting professional: “I think they [accounting professionals] are more and more familiar with it
[ethics and rules]. Not to say that they were not but, it is getting more …After Sarbanes and Oxley,
it has been really emphasized in the accounting world and the accounting profession. If you are
really on the job, you would be really careful about things like that.”
HR professionals are likewise bound by organizational policies, as well as federal and state regulations governing
treatment of employees.
HR professional: "Because a lot of the rules that are in place in HR [are] not like ‘Oh you can take a
short cut and get away with it’. It’s like this is the rule and you know its legality."
This need to be in compliance with laws and regulations appears to extend to other rules and procedures that may
exist. Accountants see legal liabilities involved with taking risks, feel the need to take personal responsibility for
actions, and believe that in the accounting profession there is much to lose by taking risks, thus making them a
conservative group, overall.
Accounting professional: "They [accounting professionals] are very skeptical towards taking risk
because the underlying principle for accountants is conservatism. If you are ever skeptical about an
event or transaction or you feel that it is a risk then you lean more towards conservatism."
HR professionals, with a few exceptions, identified themselves as a “risk-averse group.” They attributed their risk
aversion to the expectation of their job and profession to be compliant to various rules, regulations, and procedures,
and the eventual risk of litigation. To cite one of the respondents:
HR professional: "I would say that they are risk averse. Because a large part of our job is to ensure
that the organization and employees are meeting certain regulations, certain standards set by the
federal state local governments. So, we are in the mode of compliance. So, taking risk is kind of
going outside of that."
5

We have explicitly identified the profession of the respondent in some instances to avoid confusion.
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Accountants further extend their risk-aversion to other beliefs that reduce organizational risk. Their work revolves
around financial data. Accuracy of such data is critical, and thus they consider it advisable to verify work done at
levels below them. This is consistent with their beliefs about the need for hierarchy in organizations, which
delineates responsibilities and allows for managerial guidance and supervision. But managerial guidance is
expected to be consistent with professional guidelines.
The beliefs of HR professionals on the issue of hierarchy are best reflected in the group’s view that they are the
keepers of organizational charts.
HR professional: "In my experience, you know, HR people are pretty quick to, you know, bring out
the organization chart to show, you know, here is where you are and here is where your boss is and
here is how your boss fits in to the hierarchy above you. All these organizations that I worked for
was very hierarchical in nature. There was an emphasis of you always knowing your place in the
machine."
Their acceptance of a hierarchy is consistent with their willingness to comply with managerial directives. When they
disagree with managers, they will express the disagreement, but comply when directed to do so. To cite one of the
respondents on this issue:
HR professional: "They are going to share their perspectives on the issue. But, at the end of the
day they are going to do what they are told to do."
Thus, accountants and HR professionals present a coherent picture in their beliefs related to risks, rules, and
regulations, as well as the need for hierarchy. They believe in minimizing risk and complying with rules and
regulations. They believe that a hierarchical structure is necessary for the orderly functioning of a system.
General Beliefs of Marketing Professionals
Marketing professionals present a consistent picture of a group more prone to taking risks, with a lower regard for
rules, and a relatively lower level of concern for managerial directives. They view taking risks as important to their
success.
"Generally they [marketing professionals] would think that ‘There’s nothing to gain if you don’t take
risk’ so, they are above average in terms of taking risks."
Consistent with that, marketing professionals will circumvent rules when necessary. Marketing professionals view
rules and procedures as guidelines rather than inflexible directives. Marketing professionals reserve the right to bend
the rules, and do so, when the rules are time consuming, or problematic, or impede the flexibility of their work
schedules. In the words of one of the respondents:
"They [marketing professionals] see rules and procedures as guidelines as they can be bent a
little… and if there is a loophole you can go through it. But, if it is not bendable or a loophole they
will not do it."
Marketing professionals further seem to believe that supervision and reporting requirements are not the road to
success.
"It [what marketing professionals expect from management] is more like ‘When there is a problem I
will call you or ask you. In the mean time tell me I am doing a great job.’"
Overwhelmingly, marketing professionals want very little influence from management. They believe that managers
should provide high level guidance and allow the marketing professionals to decide on the details of how to get the
work done.
“You [management] do not have to tell us [marketing professionals]. [I’d] rather have you guide me
through the process than … you tell me what to do. Unless I ask you or I do not know what … it is.”
This belief stems from the feeling that non-marketing managers do not have adequate marketing expertise, and
should therefore stick to what they know best (i.e., management). There is also the associated fear that managerial
involvement will curtail the freedom necessary to get their job done. Further, they believe that influence from
management may also skew the outcome of their work. In the words of one marketing researcher,
“Very little [influence from management]. From [a marketer’s] perspective they are trying to produce
data for these managers to answer, to make the decision. Sometimes they get too involved, they
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kind of skew that data or kind of push the answer or the question to another question, when you are
trying to work on this question.”
Marketing professionals believe that a hands-off style of management will foster creativity and provide an
environment where they can perform effectively.
Overall, marketing professionals come across as willing to take chances, ignoring rules when possible, and wanting
to assert their independence at every chance.
General Beliefs of IS Professionals
IS professionals present a somewhat confused picture. They believe that they are risk averse. Their risk aversion
stems from the belief that organizations are highly dependent on information systems. Quote from a respondent:
"IT professionals are generally averse to risk because they are charged with maintaining the
organization’s information resources, and, they can’t afford risk because if they take a risk and
information resources are compromised, there is no way to get it back. So, the potential loss is too
high and they don’t want to take risk."
This conservative view applies to the maintenance of the technical infrastructure, as well as the day-to-day
operations of the technology. On the other hand, the frequent changes in technology present risks related to the
choice of new technologies to adopt, and timing risks related to when to upgrade to or adopt new technologies. In
such situations, a certain degree of risk is unavoidable. In this case, their attitudes became:
“They would think risk is part of IT and specifically software development. I think they believe that it
has to be managed.”
Given their primary belief about being risk averse, surprisingly, IS professionals are reluctant followers of rules. They
concede the need for rules and procedures, but tend to question them frequently. In particular, they seem to believe
that rules with respect to information systems are for others and not for themselves.
"They [IS professionals] will be happy to make rules and procedures but, following other people’s
rules and procedures would probably be seen by them as stupid sometimes."
Their beliefs about managers and hierarchy are consistent with their reluctant observance of rules and regulations.
IS professionals believe that managers should provide broad goals and facilitate access to resources. Other than
that, they believe that IS professionals should have the freedom to accomplish tasks without micromanagement.
Thus, IS professionals present a mixed picture. The group recognizes the criticality of the information infrastructure
and routine processing under their charge, causing them to be risk averse. On other fronts, their beliefs reflect a
group that wants independence, without being shackled by rules or managerial directives.
Summary of General Beliefs of Professions
Our analysis indicates that accounting and HR professionals are risk averse and rule compliant, and believe strongly
in the role of hierarchy and managerial initiatives. Marketing professionals came across as almost rebellious—
believing that their success as marketers depended on their willingness to take risks, that rules can be bent when
necessary, and that managers should help when called upon, but otherwise stay away. IS professionals are
schizophrenic: risk averse on basic functions, but risk tolerant when it comes to new technology. They believe in the
value of rules for others, but do not see the need to follow them themselves (“do as I say, not as I do”). They
acknowledged the need for hierarchy, but saw a limited role for managerial directives.
In terms of general beliefs, accountants and HR professionals are at one end of a “general beliefs” spectrum (beliefs
about risk, compliance with rules and procedures, and the importance of hierarchy), with marketing at the other end.
Accountants and HR professionals are conservative, compliant with rules, and desirous of an organized structure
with clear delineation of responsibilities. Marketing professionals believe in taking risks, circumventing rules, and
asserting their independence, all in the search for success. IS professionals fall between these two extremes,
believing it necessary to be risk averse in discharging their duties with respect to the information infrastructure, but
otherwise wanting to be independent of rules and managerial guidance.
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Security-Related Beliefs
The security-related beliefs of relevance are: what is information security, who is responsible for it, what role does
the group play in ensuring security, what is their awareness of security issues, what is their propensity to take
security risks in general, and what is their propensity to take security risks under performance pressure?
Security Beliefs of Accounting Profession
Respondents from accounting pointed out that professional associations, like the American Accounting Association
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), provide courses, seminars, workshops, online
self-study courses, and training on information security issues. This education may account for the fact that
accountants have the most comprehensive view of information security. They view it as including the safeguarding
of all the information in the organization, along with the associated information infrastructure. This encompasses
accounting information, sales information, employee information, and so on. Infrastructure protection includes
actions like locking server rooms, protection of physical files, and restricting access to other sensitive areas and
material. The following quotes, first from a respondent who has worked as a staff accountant, and then from a
respondent who has worked as an external auditor, highlight this.
Respondent 1: “[For an accounting professional, the definition of Information Security means]
Protection of the company’s information that is internal information. [company’s internal information
refers to] Any of the company’s internal information, any of the accounting, all the sales data, the
customer’s information.”
Respondent 2: “From one standpoint it would be the information that I have gotten from my client
that it is secured from passing on [to] somebody else. The information that I have in my company
files is secured from passing on to anybody outside such as….”
Consistent with this, they believed that all employees and departments shared the responsibility for information
security in the organization. However, a few of the accounting respondents went on to state that IS professionals
had a special responsibility to take the lead on security issues, and that accountants had a special responsibility with
respect to accounting information.
Accountants were fairly cognizant of information security risks. They were firm in their belief that they would not
violate security procedures. Their mindset was to observe rules.
"Their [accounting professionals] belief is that even the non-accounting related rules and procedures
are still meant to protect their own work. [They would follow non-accounting rules and procedures] to
the full extent."
Their willingness to follow rules and their cognizance of security issues makes them unwilling to violate security
rules, even in the pursuit of performance.
"I think it depends on what the risk is. I think in every profession, there is cost benefit and so, I think
you weigh the risk of breach of security with, you know, the benefit of doing it. So, would I say never
No…I wouldn’t say we would never ever breach that. But I would say that we are fairly conservative
about wanting to ever breach that."
This tendency is further reinforced by the enactment of laws related to privacy and confidentiality. Certain nuances
are worth noting. While security rules are observed, beliefs favor productivity when no rule exists. Also, while they
have strong beliefs about observing security rules, they are not above circumventing those rules at times.
"You took your laptop wherever you went. We had several instances reporting that the laptops were
stolen. I took mine when I was on vacations."
Overall, accounting professionals have a good deal of knowledge about information security issues. They are willing
to accept responsibility for keeping information secure, and treat security tasks on par with their accounting tasks.
The profession is based on standards and rules, and encourages a conservative mindset. The willingness to comply
with rules aligns well with the beliefs and behaviors necessary to enhance security. Thus, the accounting profession
presents a strong security culture oriented toward the protection of information assets in organizations.
Security Beliefs of HR Professionals
HR professionals indicated that their beliefs about information security come more from within the organizations that
they work for than the profession itself. Their belief about information security is limited to the protection of
information pertaining to employee records.
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"For the most part it [information security for HR professionals] relates to employee management
i.e. making sure that every aspect of [the] employee file is kept confidential and only certain
individuals have access to various levels of information such as social security numbers, birthdays,
marital status [and] things like that."
In addition to their own role in keeping such information safe, they believed it was necessary to communicate to
other employees the importance of keeping such information secure and confidential. Their awareness of
information security risks was limited. While accepting the major responsibility for keeping employee information
secure, almost all respondents in the study said they believed that it is the responsibility of IS professionals to
ensure information security as a whole within organizations.
In line with their reluctance to take risks in general as part of their job, HR professionals had strong beliefs about not
taking information security risks. To quote a compensation analyst:
"I do not think that they [HR professionals] would take that risk for two reasons. 1. Because of their
code of ethics and their general way of being risk averse, and, 2. I don’t think they would know how
to do it because, we don’t understand information technology."
When it came to rule compliance, HR professionals did not make a distinction between general rules and
procedures and specific rules and procedures for security. They believed it was necessary to comply with all sets of
rules.
"…in general I think there is a strong sense of responsibility in obligation just to follow all the rules
and procedures. Because, we [HR professionals] know there is a reason for them. A lot of times we
are enforcing a lot of reporting deadlines and rules, procedures, and, people don’t understand
them. So, we are always having to communicate the reason why—if it’s state, federal, or local laws.
So, there is a general awareness and kind of this tendency to comply and follow along with the
rules."
Their general belief in observing rules and regulations extends to their willingness to observe security rules and
regulations. HR professionals also admitted that their lack of expertise in the area of security was part of the reason
for their willingness to follow security rules unquestioningly. For similar reasons, they were willing to comply with
managerial directives about security.
"They [HR professionals] would give 100% weight [to managerial directives]. If it’s not your domain
or you know nothing about it and if the management does, then you listen to them."
HR professionals, similar to their accounting counterparts, are subject to privacy and confidentiality laws. This
reinforces their tendency to comply with rules. It also inhibits any tendency to violate security under performance
pressure. But subtle exceptions to this are acknowledged.
"I [HR professional] have to get a notification because, [if] a kid is very badly hurt and he needs
medical assistance then, I am not going to care about security. Those are high pressure situations
for me that are very, very unique."
Overall, HR professionals are a rule-compliant group, who are risk averse and follow managerial directives on all
issues including security issues. They believe it is necessary to avoid violating security policies even under
performance pressure except under extreme circumstances. HR professionals have strong beliefs about their role in
and responsibility for maintaining the security of confidential information about employees. However, the same
beliefs do not clearly extend to all aspects of security, or other types of information. In particular, while they accept
the responsibility for the security of employee information, they believe that the responsibility for overall information
security lies with information system professionals. HR professionals’ beliefs of information security are less holistic
than that of the accounting professionals. But they seem to be strongly rooted in the concept of abiding by rules,
including those related to security, even in situations of high performance pressure. Thus, it would appear that their
contribution to the protection of information assets can be equally effective.
Security Beliefs of Marketing Professionals
Marketing professionals said that most of their knowledge about security came from within the organization, little
from outside. They have a very limited perspective on information security. Marketing professionals viewed
information security as the protection of three types of information: (1) confidential information pertaining to products
that they market, (2) confidential information about clients for whom they market the products, and (3) information
about customers to whom they market the products. The protection of confidential information about the products is
considered part of their responsibility to safeguard the intellectual knowledge of the organization that they work for.
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The protection of confidential information about clients (organizations for whom they market the product) and
customers (individuals or organizations that buy the product) is considered necessary to maintain the trust of the
clients and customers. As one of the respondents with experience in advertising puts it:
“Well, in order to segment, target position or perform other marketing activities we need to know
names, addresses or sometimes personal information if it is internal, purchasing experiences. So,
it’s [a] lot of information that the customers would not be happy if someone else got their hands
on….”
They also understood that they should protect their computers (although their concept of protecting their computer
was primarily limited to “don’t lose your laptop”) and not give out their passwords. They considered all other aspects
of information security as the responsibility of senior management and IS professionals.
"The IT department [is responsible for information security issues in organizations]… Because, we
[marketing professionals] perceive ourselves being experts in duties that we perform. In the same
line we view information security as information technology…within their domain."
Marketing professionals do not believe in taking information security risks, in contrast to their willingness to take
other forms of risks. This belief is rooted in the knowledge of the importance of information they possess, the
importance of ensuring the confidentiality of that information, and the consequences of not ensuring the
confidentiality of the information. Further, marketing professionals accept that there are issues of information
security that they do not understand, making it more dangerous to take chances. A quote from a respondent:
"[taking information security risks] That is different. Because, that is not like being risky on your own
terms. That is being risky with company security and you do not want to do that. So, I probably think
they wouldn’t be as comfortable as being risky with that kind of information."
This translated to a willingness to observe security regulations. Once again, this willingness is primarily rooted in
their lack of knowledge about security.
"I think there isn’t a lot that they [marketing professionals] could do about it. I think they would be
much more accepting. I don’t think we really have a lot of understanding about some other
departments."
But marketing professionals acknowledge that, under performance pressure, performance would take precedence.
"It would be just getting the job done first of all. Because, you know information security really does
not impact their job. It is not their [marketing professionals’] responsibility."
Overall, marketing professionals seem to have minimal knowledge or awareness about security. They view security
as the responsibility of others, and their only concession appears to be a willingness to observe security rules. But
this also seems a limited willingness, based on their perspective that performance needs should take precedence
over security.
Security Beliefs of IS Professionals
IS professionals receive most of their security-related knowledge from professional sources. In particular, they did
not view either the organization or the online and print media as a useful source. These sources were considered
reactive, and thus failed to provide relevant information in a timely manner. In fact, IS professionals believed that
their group educates senior management on security issues and develops security initiatives, policies, and
procedures.
IS professionals view information security primarily in terms of safeguarding the information residing in the
information technology infrastructure, which includes the computers, networks, and the software applications. Some
of the tools that they associate with information security include passwords, intrusion detection systems, firewalls,
and role-based access control systems. Thus, it would appear that they view information security primarily as a
technical problem. This, presumably, leads to the belief that the IS group is and should be the group responsible for
information security in organizations. They believe that members of other professional groups, such as accounting,
marketing, and human relations, view IS professionals as responsible for security, a charge that they feel capable of
fulfilling. IS professionals further believe that while management may have the ultimate responsibility for security, it
is the responsibility of the IS group to guide management on security issues, both by educating managers and by
proposing security initiatives. They also believe that they are responsible for developing security policies and
implementing them. Further, IS professionals believe that they are aware of security issues (i.e., what the dangers
are and how to minimize them).
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Consistent with their beliefs about the importance of security in organizations, they express an unwillingness to take
security risks or violate meaningful security rules and regulations. Violations of rules have serious consequences,
including the possibility of being dismissed from the job. However, such attitudes toward compliance are challenged
when the group is confronted with the need to meet productivity or performance objectives. Most of the respondents
in our study indicated that IS professionals strongly believed that security and productivity issues could be at odds
with each other. When the respondents were specifically asked how IS professionals handle trade-offs between
getting the job done and information security issues, most of them said that getting the job done will come first, and
security issues will take a back seat. The reasons IS professionals provide for the emphasis on job demands over
security include pressure from the management to be productive, and their belief that they get paid for getting their
job done, not for taking care of security issues within the organization.
"I think, in the end, if they [IS professionals] had to choose between the two, they would get the job
done. Because that’s what they get paid for, that’s their job, task and its number one."
In sum, IS professionals exhibit an awareness of the technical aspects of information security, and claim a
leadership role in IS information security issues. They seem willing to observe security rules because of the risks
associated with violating them, but their stand changes when faced with the choice between security and
performance. Thus, in spite of their belief that they have superior knowledge about security issues, they are
vulnerable to the demands of performance.
Summary of Information Security Beliefs
Currently, accounting professionals express a set of beliefs that are most reflective of a strong security culture. HR
professionals were not quite as holistic as accountants in their beliefs about what information security is, and who is
responsible for it. Further, their awareness of security risks seemed less comprehensive than that of IS
professionals. However, IS professionals appeared more likely to pursue productivity at the expense of security.
Marketing professionals believed that their role in security was limited to safeguarding confidential information
regarding customers and following security rules and regulations put in place by others. We elaborate on our
findings further at this stage.
The common theme that runs through the security beliefs of different professions is that the IS group is the primary
arbiter of information security issues, which reflects a techno-centric view of security. Each profession appears to
accept responsibility for a particular niche of information security. The groups acknowledge a role in protecting the
core information that they handle: accountants for accounting information, HR for employee information, marketing
for customer information, and IS for information residing in the computers and networks. The awareness of
information security issues related to the technological infrastructure is limited in most non-IS groups, consistent with
their belief that security is the primary responsibility of the IS group. The non-IS groups state that they will comply
with security rules, if there is no other competing demand. Surprisingly, even the IS professionals believed that their
professional cohorts would favor getting the job done over complying with security regulations.

A Brief Comparison of Information Security Cultures
Summary comparisons of the information security cultures of the four professions are shown in Tables 9 and 10
(parts 1 and 2). The security-related beliefs of professionals taken together with their group identities and other
relevant beliefs provide an overview of the security cultures of different professional groups. Our premise that there
will be differences in the security cultures of different professions has been borne out. Our data suggest the
accounting profession has a strong security culture, the marketing profession a weak security culture, with the IS
and HR professions falling somewhere between the two.
Accounting professionals have a holistic view of security that is consistent both with their professional identity and
their general beliefs about rules and compliance. Their professional identity is that of a group charged with ensuring
the accuracy of financial statements, the discharge of which requires clear procedures, and strict adherence to rules.
Ensuring security also requires compliance with security policies, procedures and rules. Thus, compliance with
security rules is in line with their normal propensity to comply with rules. They tend to view security as everyone’s
responsibility, even if IS is assigned the lead role. They are aware that information security includes the protection of
all the information in the organization and the information infrastructure. They believe strongly in complying with
security rules. They do not believe in violations of security rules to meet performance requirements, except under
extreme circumstances. It is clear that their security-related beliefs are in keeping with their primary culture of rule
compliance and willingness to follow directives.
The marketing profession’s identity is that of a group that improves an organization’s competitiveness and
profitability by helping the customers understand the organization’s products and helping the organization
understand the customers’ needs. Increasing sales and profitability involves a willingness to take risks to accomplish
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Table 9: Summary Comparison of Information Security Cultures of Professions (Part 1 of 2)
Category
Identity
Role 1

Role 2

Contribution to
organization

Contribution to
society

General Beliefs
Compliance with
rules and laws
Propensity to risk

Hierarchy

Profession
Accounting

Human resources

Marketing

Information systems

Ensure validity and
accuracy of financial
statements

Help recruit
employees that fit
into the
organization

Offer technical
expertise and
guidance

Bridge between
shareholders and
managers
Improve efficiency
and profitability of
organization
Provide confidence
in corporations;
protect shareholder
interests

Bridge between
employees and
organization
Contribute to
strategic goals by
recruiting correct
employees
Ensure employees
are treated in
compliance with
the law

Educate
customers about
the organization’s
products;
inform the
company about the
customer’s needs
Bridge between
customers and
organization
Improve
profitability by
meeting customer
needs
Help society meet
its consumption
needs

High

High

Low

Low

Low

High; taking risks
is considered
necessary for
success

Need to comply with
instructions from
higher levels

Need to comply
with instructions
from higher levels

Lower level of
concern for
managerial
directives

Reluctant follower of
rules
Mixed. Want stable
operations because
of organizational
dependency on
technology; have to
be willing to be
innovative (i.e., willing
to take risks) when
new advances come
Would like guidance
to be limited to broad
directions

Bridge between
technology and
organization
Help organization use
technology to its
benefit
Help society use
technology to its
benefit.

goals. The risks taken are sometimes associated with a deviation from rules and managerial directives. Thus, there
is a general belief that rules can be ignored if the circumstances demand it. This spills over into their belief system
about security rules and regulations. While there is a willingness to abide by security rules in normal times, there is a
readiness to ignore them when they get in the way of fulfilling their primary responsibilities. This value system is
consistent with their belief that they have a small role to play in information security, due to their perception that the
primary responsibility for security belongs to management and IS professionals. Marketing professionals follow rules
only to the extent such rules do not get in the way of their productivity or performance.
HR and IS professionals seem to fall in between accounting and marketing professionals. HR professionals view
their role as ensuring the equal treatment of all employees, which is tied in with the need to comply with federal and
state statutes and rules. They believe in avoiding risks. Thus, similar to the accounting profession, their beliefs about
complying with rules and avoiding risks in general carry over to complying with security rules and not taking risks
with respect to security. Where they differed from the accounting profession was that they had a narrower view of
what information security is—their beliefs restricted information security to the safeguarding of employee records.
Also, there was a lower level of awareness of risks associated with technology. Thus, while their beliefs about
complying with security rules strengthened security culture, their narrow definition of security and reduced
awareness of technical issues related to security indicated vulnerabilities.
IS professionals view their primary role as enhancing organizational efficiency and productivity through the use of
information technology. Frequent changes in technologies require that they be willing to take risks in their pursuit of
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Table 10: Summary Comparison of Information Security Cultures of Professions (Part 2 of 2)
Category
Security beliefs
Source of beliefs
Primary focus

Who is responsible

Awareness
Security risk taking

Profession
Accounting
Profession
Accounting focus
on accounting
information
Mostly everyone;
IS personnel have
special
responsibility;
accounting
personnel have
special
responsibility for
accounting info
Aware that risks
exist
Low

Human resources

Marketing

Information systems

Mostly from their
organization
HR focus on
employee
information
IS department
responsible for
information
security

Mostly from their
organization
Client-related
information

Profession

Primarily IS
department

Limited awareness

Limited awareness

Low

Don’t understand
security; don’t
mess with it
Willing to follow
security rules

IS believes that
everyone else holds
them responsible; IS
believes that they have
to guide management
on security issues; IS
believes they have to
come up with security
policies
High awareness of
technical risk
Low

Compliance with
security rules

Prone to comply

High

Security vs.
productivity

Sometimes have
to violate security
rules

For the most part,
security wins;
make exceptions
in special cases

Performance
needs take
precedence

Information stored in
technology

Yes, on issues that IS
group considers
important
Getting job done takes
precedence

higher efficiencies. On the other hand, they need to ensure the integrity and reliability of the technology
infrastructure on a day-to-day basis, which leads to the belief that they should not take risks. In spite of the latter,
overall they come across as risk takers. This applies to their beliefs about information security. So while they are
knowledgeable about information security, they tend to believe that it is permissible to ignore security policies in
pursuit of productivity (perhaps because they view themselves as cognizant of risks and consequences).
Comparing the security cultures of HR professionals to IS professionals, it can be seen that HR professionals are
less prone to take risks, more compliant with security rules and managerial directives, but have a narrower
awareness of security issues. IS professionals, on the other hand, are more aware of security issues, but more
prone to take risks and circumvent security rules.
Overall, while professional groups may share individual characteristics of security culture, the aggregate security
culture of each professional group appears to be relatively unique.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Based on the preceding analysis of the data gleaned from our interviews, and an understanding of the literature that
is available, we have developed a set of propositions to illuminate the interplay and interrelationships between
differentiated professional cultures and security cultures, including inconsistencies between culturally related beliefs
and subsequent behavior under conditions of performance pressure. In the absence of hypotheses to confirm or
disconfirm, these propositions constitute part of the contributions of this research. In addition, these propositions
also provide direction for future research.

The Conceptualization of Security Culture
Our proposed theoretical framework is that security culture is a composite of the three dimensions: beliefs about the
identity of the profession, general beliefs about risk and compliance, and security-related beliefs (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Conceptualization of Information Security Culture
Thus, our work provides a parsimonious set of dimensions to characterize information security cultures of
professional groups. As discussed in the section on Theoretical Framework, the three dimensions are derived from
the frameworks proposed by Chia et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005]. The results in the current study show a
consistency between the three categories of beliefs: beliefs about identity, beliefs about rule compliance, and beliefs
about security. The idea that factors that influence behaviors in non-security domains can influence security-related
behaviors has been suggested by others. For instance, Bulgurcu et al. [2010] argue that the motivation to follow
rules and regulations in general can be extended to “expect that similar motivations exist in the context of ISP
(Information Security Policy) compliance” [p. 526]. Thus, in understanding the security culture of a group it is
worthwhile to simultaneously examine the group’s identity and other related beliefs. This leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The information security culture of a profession is rooted in its beliefs about its
identity, its general beliefs about risk and compliance, and its security-related beliefs.
This is important because it points out that cultural characteristics of professions outside the immediate realm of
security can also help inform on the information security cultures of professions. In particular, the identity of the
profession and the general beliefs about risk and compliance are useful in understanding the security cultures of
professional groups.
Security Cultures of Professions
Research on security culture to date has focused on conceptualizing security culture: that is, defining the term and
identifying dimensions [Chia et al., 2002; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005], or describing security cultures at an
organizational level [e.g., Ruighaver et al., 2007]. There is no prior study definitively reporting differences in security
cultures across professions, although it has been suggested that IS security has different meanings for different
occupational communities [Vaast, 2007]. The Vaast study was conducted in a hospital, and examined the views of
doctors, nurses, clerical staff, technicians, managers, and so on. Further, Zakaria and Gani [2003] have shown that
managerial perceptions of security are different from end-user perspectives of security, and Smith et al. [2010] also
indicate differences between managerial and employee perceptions of information security. The professional culture
literature reports that there can be major differences in cultures across professions [Trice, 1993; Mills and
Tsamenyeni, 2000]. Thus, differences in security cultures across professions should not be surprising. The current
study has found support for the existence of differences in security cultures across professions. Thus, it can be
proposed:
Proposition 2: Information security cultures vary across professions.
This result is significant because the study provides preliminary empirical evidence for differences in security
cultures across professions. The additional contribution is that, for these four professions, the information security
culture has been characterized. It can form the basis of understanding what lapses in security behavior may occur in
each group, and appropriate steps taken to avoid them.

Action Inconsistency
In the discussion of differentiated cultures, action inconsistency has been defined as the differences that exist
between beliefs and behaviors in a culture [Martin, 1992]. Differences between beliefs and behaviors have been
reported by others. Smith et al. [2010] report that senior managers, while implementing a security compliance
program, failed to allocate adequate financial resources for the initiative. Similarly, Puhakainen and Siponen [2010]
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report that the CEO in their study, while arranging for security training for his employees, was perceived to be slack
in complying with the company’s information security policies. These two examples show that while management
believed security to be important enough to implement security initiatives, their behaviors were not consistent with
those beliefs. Similarly at the employee level, behavior has been reported to deviate from beliefs: “… four employees
felt that work overload, hurrying, suddenly emerging situations and unplanned assignments hindered their
compliance with the email policy” [Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010, p. 767].
The possible existence of similar inconsistencies between security-related beliefs and security-related actions has
been identified in the current study. Interviews examining self-reported beliefs and behaviors are likely to suffer from
social demand bias in the answers of the respondents. It would be inappropriate for respondents to indicate that they
believed that security was unimportant, or that they would violate security rules. Further, they would tend to be
discreet about any security violations that they may have engaged in or observed. Either in keeping with these, or
responding truthfully, respondents belonging to all professions said that they believed that security rules should not
be violated. However, under conditions of performance pressure, all groups appeared to believe, to a lesser or
greater extent, that security rules may have to be ignored. Accounting and HR professionals try to incorporate
security procedures into their normal work-routine, but still admitted that they were prone to occasional
circumventing of security rules under pressure to complete tasks. IS and marketing professionals readily admitted
their bias to productivity-related objectives over security expectations. Thus, there are differences between stated
beliefs that security rules should not be violated, and actual practices of circumventing security rules under
performance pressure. This leads to:
Proposition 3a: There may be inconsistencies between security-related beliefs and security-related
behaviors, particularly at times of performance pressure.
The conflict between security and productivity poses one of the biggest challenges. The interesting point to note is
that even the more conservative and rule-compliant groups, such as accounting and human resources, confess to
the circumvention of security at times of performance pressure.

Functional Orientation of Professions
The categorization of functions in organizations has received scattered attention in management literature.
Additionally, the categories and their definitions are not consistent across studies. We use the categorizations
suggested by Thompson [1965] to categorize professions by their primary functions. Thompson (1965) states that
conditions within a bureaucracy are determined by a drive for productivity and control. Productivity refers to the
maximization of the goal(s) as set by the owner(s) of the organization. Control refers to the processes in place to
achieve reliable and predictable behaviors. Based on these definitions, marketing and information systems can be
seen to be predominantly production functions, and human resources and accounting to be predominantly control
functions. Marketing is aimed at maximizing sales; information systems is aimed at using technology to maximize
the efficiency of diverse functions as sales, production (manufacturing), record keeping, and so on. In contrast,
human resources is focused on controlling processes to ensure consistent application of rules and compliance with
governmental regulations across employees (i.e., achieve reliable and predictable behaviors in these areas).
Similarly, the accounting function controls financial record keeping (i.e., applies GAAP rules to produce reliable and
predictable records of financial performance).
Previous studies have not examined differences in security-related behaviors across professions. In the current
study, we note that the two groups (accounting and HR) with a primary focus on control functions show a greater
tendency to comply with rules and security than the two (marketing and information systems) with a primary focus on
productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency, even under performance pressure.
Proposition 3b: Production-oriented groups are more likely to have inconsistencies between
security-related beliefs and security-related behaviors than control-oriented groups.
This proposition is important because it provides generalizable guidance on which groups are more likely to deviate
from security-related behaviors. Further, there is the possibility that the pressures from production-oriented groups
can spill over to other related groups. This is evident from the complaint of one respondent in the Puhakainen and
Siponen [2010] study: “Sometimes management and salesmen give us unusual, unplanned and urgent
assignments. This makes us too busy even to think about IS security --…” [p. 767].

The Techno-centric View of Information Security
Our results indicate the IS group is seen as a key player, if not the key player, in security initiatives. This reflects a
techno-centric view of security. Accounting professionals appear to have a more holistic perspective of security,
acknowledging the security responsibilities of all individuals, but still seeing a significant role for the IS group.
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Researchers have emphasized the dangers of viewing security as a technical problem [Dhillon, 1997; Siponen,
2000]. Other researchers have determined that managers also tend to view information security as a technical issue
that is the responsibility of IS professionals [Guzman et al., 2004]. The tendency of management to view information
security as the responsibility of IT is also reported by Smith et al. [2010]. Interestingly, Vaast [2007] reported that IS
professionals in a hospital setting viewed information security as a technical problem. Thus, the efforts of information
security researchers to disseminate the idea that information security is a complex combination of technical,
managerial, and behavioral issues have yet to bear fruit, as expressed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Information security cultures of all professions continue to be rooted in a technocentric view of security.
The pervasiveness of this belief is surprising given that most security professionals have been preaching that
information security should not be viewed as a technical problem alone, and should be addressed holistically (i.e.,
with behavioral, organizational, and technical controls). The greatest danger could occur when they see the
responsibility for information security as belonging to others, and professional groups (primarily IS) fail to see their
own responsibilities. Such misperceptions of professional groups may be further aggravated when top management
also has a techno-centric view of information security.

Security Awareness
Information security awareness plays a crucial role in effective interpretation and use of information security policies,
procedures, and technologies by the end-users [Siponen, 2000]. In our study, the HR professionals did not claim
security awareness, but were willing to follow security rules, with few exceptions. IS professionals, on the other
hand, claimed a sufficiently high awareness level to stake a leadership role in security, but admitted a bias toward
performance over security under pressure. IS professionals also did not believe strongly in complying with the rules.
This comparison of HR and IS professions suggests that while security awareness is important, it could prove of little
value unless it is accompanied by a strong willingness to comply with rules. This results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Security awareness is a necessary but not sufficient condition to build a strong
information security culture.
This proposition challenges one line of thinking currently present in the area of security (i.e., that security awareness
is the key to improving information security) [Albrechtsen, 2007; Siponen, 2000]. It is true that security awareness is
necessary, but our research suggests that that is not sufficient. Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] made similar
observations. They report in their study that despite “a high level of employee awareness of IS security issues ….
the IS security manager saw violations of information security policies and procedures, especially the e-mail policy.”
[p. 765]. We argue that culturally, the group has to be willing to engage, and translate that awareness into action to
result in a strong information security culture.

Contributions and Implications
The contributions of the study, along with the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, are discussed
next. First, we have proposed a framework to conceptualize the security culture of a profession based on the
identity, the general beliefs, and the security-related beliefs of the professional members. In line with this framework
we have logically developed and provided a preliminary qualitative empirical basis for a set of propositions to inform
and guide future research. There is consistency in the beliefs related to the three categories. Both theoretically and
practically, this implies that a cogent understanding of the security culture of a profession can be greatly enhanced
by simultaneously examining the three sets of beliefs.
Second, our study suggests that while there are overlaps between the security cultures of different professions,
there are also differences. The existence of differences may not be surprising. However, the finding is important for
two reasons. One, in an organization, employees are influenced both by organizational and professional cultures
[Trice, 1993]. Thus, in attempting to establish a strong security culture in an organization, managers must
understand the influences of the professional security culture, and either leverage or compensate that influence
based on whether the professional influence is beneficial or not. While this may seem obvious, none of the published
literature [e.g., Leach, 2003; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005; Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004] on the development of
information security culture in organizations recommends customized approaches for different groups in an
organization. Two, the identification of specific differences in information security cultures between professions will
be helpful in the formulation of customized approaches for different professions. For example, accounting groups are
more risk averse while marketing groups are less risk averse. Thus, it is more necessary to help the marketing group
internalize the idea that taking risks in marketing is different from taking security-related risks.
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Third, during times when task demands increase performance pressure, there appears to be a greater willingness to
circumvent security if it presents barriers to the efficient execution of the tasks. Our study indicates that the
readiness with which a professional group surrenders security in favor of productivity varies across groups.
Production-oriented professional groups (such as marketing and IS) seem to be more willing to favor productivity
over security than control-oriented professional groups (such as accounting and HR) in our study. There is the
potential to develop theoretical explanations why this is so, which we will leave to future research. From a practical
perspective, the implication is to seek ways to reduce the conflict between productivity and security. In today’s
corporate environments, where the constant refrain is “do more with less,” management may wish to step back and
examine the effects that this perennial focus on productivity has on security. Alternatively, in a security-conscious
organization, management may wish to focus more education and monitoring efforts on those groups that exhibit a
tendency to favor productivity over security.
Fourth, our study suggests that while all professional groups acknowledge some responsibility for information
security, there is a near unanimous belief that information security is the bailiwick of IS professionals. This is
consistent with a techno-centric view of information security, and in contrast to a growing belief among most
researchers and many practitioners that information security is everyone’s responsibility. From an academic
perspective, this highlights a disconnect in the IS literature between the theoretical and prescriptive
acknowledgement that information security is a socio-organizational issue [e.g., Von Solms, 2006] and empirical
findings that "information security research has primarily focused on technical issues" [Siponen and OinasKukkonen, 2007, p. 73]. From a practitioner perspective, this highlights an opportunity to improve information
security by recognizing that although human behavior is a significant problem in implementing effective information
security practices [Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007], group members are often unaware of this, and think that a
combination of technology and the IS function is sufficient to safeguard organizational information assets. Focused
outreach initiatives might educate individuals on this issue and make them more aware of their own security
responsibilities.
Lastly, in comparing the security awareness and beliefs about compliance of the HR and IS groups, there can be a
disassociation between awareness and compliance. We have noted that IS professionals are more aware of
security, but show a greater willingness to deviate from security rules, while HR professionals who are less aware of
security risks are more willing to comply with the security rules. Thus, it is possible for a group to have high
awareness of security issues, but to be willing to deviate from security policies. Conversely, another group may have
low awareness but be less willing to deviate from security policies. From a theoretical standpoint, it raises the issue
of which of the two forces leads to greater information security, and under what circumstances. From a practical
point of view, security training must focus both on increasing awareness and encouraging compliance.

Limitations and Further Research
Prior to our research, there was no well established conceptualization of information security culture for professional
groups; what was available were only two proposed conceptualizations with some preliminary validation for
organizational security culture. We have adapted the existing frameworks to characterize the information security
cultures of professional groups, and provided qualitative evidence to support our conceptualization.
Our study is subject to all the limitations of studies that use qualitative techniques. Qualitative studies have limited
generalizability. Generalizability is best established by conducting large scale surveys. Thus, future research will
have to focus on large scale surveys to test the robustness of our results. A second limitation is that the respondents
were all from one part of the United States. Thus, care must be taken when generalizing the results to groups in
other parts of the United States or other parts of the world. Future research will have to replicate the study and
conduct more surveys to expand the generalizability to professional groups in other geographical areas.
The research agenda surfacing from the current study is presented next along with suggestions for future steps.
First, we have examined information security cultures independent of organizations (i.e., respondents worked in
different organizations). It would be interesting to examine whether the observed differences persist across
professional groups working in a single organization. Trice [1993] reports that cultures of professional groups in
organizations are subject to the influences of the culture of the professional group and the culture of the
organization. Thus, it could be anticipated that the information security culture of professional groups in
organizations will show the influences of the security cultures of the professions and that of the organization. At the
level of probing for differences in security cultures across professions within an organization, a study parallel to the
current study using interviews can be conducted. At a more complex level of identifying the relative influences of the
profession and the organization, it would require the study of two professions (one stronger in security culture [e.g.,
accounting], and one weaker in security culture, perhaps marketing) in two organizations that have reportedly
stronger and weaker security cultures at the organizational level. Case methodology would be best to address such
a question.
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Second, the primary goal of all security-related research is to help identify factors that will promote information
security. The belief that security culture will enhance information security is based in demonstrated relationships
between culture and performance in other areas such as organizational excellence. Comparable evidence for the
area of information security culture needs to be gathered at two levels. The first level of study would examine the
influence of culture on the compliance behavior of employees and the reduction in vulnerabilities. Such studies can
be either in-depth case studies of organizations with varying strengths of security cultures, or surveys using selfreport data from key respondents in organizations. The second level of study would examine the relationship
between security culture and the actual incidence of security breaches. Such a study is probably best approached
using survey methodology using key respondents from organizations.
Third, another challenge for researchers is to develop profession-specific techniques to improve information security
cultures. Several researchers have put forth generic proposals for improving information security cultures in
organizations [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004]. More targeted approaches are necessary. Generic
profession-independent proposals include the formulation of clear policies and procedures, awareness and
education programs, and the implementation of rewards systems. Targeted profession-specific proposals would
require differential emphasis on these factors based on the profession. For instance, marketing professionals have
lower levels of awareness than other professionals. Security culture development for the marketing group should
include a heavy emphasis on increasing awareness. In contrast, IS professionals have a high level of awareness to
begin with, but come across as overconfident in their ability to be secure. For the IS group, improving awareness will
need less emphasis than the issue of not being overconfident. In effect, an understanding of the differences in
security culture across professions can help tailor efforts to improve the security culture of each profession. Studies
requiring observations of change in cultures are necessarily longitudinal studies extending over periods of years.
Cultures are embedded deeply, and are not likely to change in the short span of a year or two. Thus, efforts to study
the effectiveness of approaches to change culture present the greatest challenges in terms of patience, time, and
resources. Essentially, such studies need pre- and post-treatment measures of security cultures, in one or more
organizations, to assess the effectiveness of the treatments.
The fourth and final suggestion relates to the observation in our study that even groups that are aware of information
security issues do deviate from recommended information security practices. This points to the need to understand
why such deviations from good practices are engaged in. The deviations range from simple ones at a low level (e.g.,
sharing passwords with others to expedite work), to more complex ones, in which top management makes
simultaneous demands of productivity and security without allocating sufficient resources to achieve both goals.
Research would have to focus on identifying the complete range of the deviations based on observations,
interviews, and surveys, and then classifying them into a parsimonious set. Subsequently, efforts will have to focus
on finding ways to reduce the deviations. The specific research projects would depend on the nature of the
deviations. Simple deviations at the individual level will need to conduct survey-based studies to elicit the role of
individual characteristics, task-based variables, and organizational level constraints. Study of deviations at a more
complex level, such as budget allocation issues, would need surveys to understand the demands on top
management.
In sum, the work in the area of information security culture has just begun. Clearly, much work remains to be done.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In an organizational setting, employee behaviors are subject to the influences of organizational culture and
professional culture. Based on this, it is necessary to gain an understanding of professional culture to understand
employee behaviors in organizations. In the current study, we focused on developing a characterization of
information security cultures of four different professions. We have provided preliminary evidence that there are
differences in the security cultures across the professions. Based on these and other findings, we have put forth
propositions related to information security cultures of professions. In essence, the results of the study support our
argument that the security cultures of different professions need to be examined more closely as a part of the field’s
attempts to improve the security culture in organizations.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
This is (interviewer name) interviewing _(respondent name)_ on __(date)______.


For the record, can you give your consent for audio taping the interview for research purposes?

 Some of the following questions may be very obvious, but I have to ask those questions for the sake of
completeness.
Work Experience


Can you briefly explain your work experience (including profile of the organization, department, the
responsibilities of the department, and responsibilities of the job)?

Questions Tapping Professionally Based Beliefs
Extent of Association with Profession


What profession do you consider yourself to be a part of?



Do you have any professional certifications (Example certifications with IS profession like MCSE, MCSP,
CCNP)? – [ WILL CUSTOMIZE THE CERTIFICATIONS DEPENDING ON THE PROFESSION/DISCIPLINE
OF THE RESPONDENT]
a. If yes, which ones?



To what extent do you participate in activities or groups associated with your profession?



Are you a member of any professional associations? (Example: ACM, IEEE for IS)? – [WILL CUSTOMIZE
THE PROFESSIONAL DEPENDING ON THE PROFESSION/DISCIPLINE OF THE RESPONDENT]
a. If yes, which ones?





Do you attend professional group meetings, gatherings, or conferences?
o

How often do you attend these meetings, gatherings, or conferences?

o

Have you attended national meetings?

o

Are you currently or have you previously been an office bearer of professional bodies associated
with your profession?

Do you regularly visit any professionally oriented websites or listservs?
a. If yes, which ones?



Do you subscribe to any industry trade magazines or journals? (Example: PC Magazine, Computers and
Security, IEEE Spectrum, Communications of the ACM, IEEE Computer for IS Professionals)? [WILL
CUSTOMIZE THE MAGAZINES DEPENDING UPON THE PROFESSION OF THE RESPONDENT]
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Do you interact with members of your profession away from work?
a. Is this interaction primarily with co-workers or with people from other firms? *



If the respondent answered YES for the previous question* then ask the following: Please answer the
following questions based on your perception of what your profession expects from you. Your answers
should be based on what you have read in trade magazines, heard in professional meetings, and think other
professional members in general believe.
b. If the respondent has answered NO for the previous question* then ask the following: Please
answer the following questions based on your perception of what members of your profession inside
your organization believe, and which you think could be applicable to members of your profession in
general (including outside the organization).



Do the professional societies you are associated with have a formal code of ethics?
o

How familiar are you with the code of ethics?

o

How familiar do you think others are with it?



Generally speaking, how do members of your profession feel toward risk-taking?



Are members of your profession optimistic or pessimistic, in general?



Can you describe what the term “information security” or “IS security or computer security” means to
members of your profession?



In your opinion, do members of your profession believe in taking information security-related risks to get a
job done?



To what extent do members of your profession seek validation of their actions from their professional peers:





o

External to their organizations?

o

Internal to their organizations?

Expectations toward complying with hierarchy, rules, and procedures
o

Do members of your profession subscribe to the idea of hierarchy?

o

If yes, do members of your profession like subscribing to the idea of hierarchy?

o

What is the belief of members of your profession about appropriate styles of management?

o

What is their belief about the level of detail that a manager should get involved in?

o

Among the members of your profession, what is the general belief about abiding by rules and
procedures?

o

What is the belief of the members of your profession on the extent to which people should abide by
rules and procedures?

Loyalty
o

Are they loyal to the profession?


What would your profession’s members say the values of your profession are?



To what extent do members of your profession believe in the values of the profession?


Would members work on upholding it whatever it takes?

In case of conflict between the values of the profession and the values of the organization, what would happen?


Responsibility/Accountability Factors
o

When it comes to decisions, what level of guidance do members of your profession need from upper
management?

o

What would be the response of members of your profession if upper management tried to specify
details on how to do the task?

o

What would their response be if upper management tried to specify details of actions outside the
domain of your profession (e.g., Security)?
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o

What would their response be if upper management entrusts responsibility to members of your
profession in doing any task?




Will that have any effect on their beliefs/actions (in regards to the task in hand)?

Expectations About the Need for Rewards
o

What motivates the members of your profession?

o

How do tangible rewards (such as money, promotion) compare to intangible rewards (such as
satisfaction and appreciation of professional peers)?

Security-Related Issues


Who do the members of your profession think is responsible for information security within organizations
they work in?



Who do the members of your profession think should be responsible for information security within
organizations they work in?



What role do the members of your profession think they play with respect to information security in an
organization?



Do members of your profession view information security as a serious problem for organizations?
o



Why?

Does your professional association have continuing education about IS-related security?
o

Like what? (E.g.., training sessions/workshops on security organized by professional groups)



Do members of your profession take IS courses as part of their education?



Do members of your profession take IS security-related courses as part of their education?

Productivity Issues


How do members of your profession define productivity?



What do members of your profession believe is the primary role of their profession in an organization?



How does this contribute to the overall performance of the organization?



Does the professional organization arrange for continuing education on improving the performances?



Do members of your professional association take part in continuing education on performance-related
issues?



How do members of your profession handle choices/trade-offs between getting the job done and information
security measures?



What kind of a connection do members of your profession see between “activities to secure information” and
“activities to be done to be productive”?

Professional Attributes


If you had to describe the “culture” of your profession, how would you describe it?



If you had to describe what your profession contributes to society, what would you say?



Who influences the security-related beliefs of the members of your profession?—the profession, each
individual’s organizational management?

If the Respondents Are IT Professionals Then Ask the Following Additional Questions
Influence of members of the IT professional group within organizations on security-related beliefs of members of
other professional groups within organizations


What is the level of interaction IT professionals have with members of other professional groups within
organizations?



Do you think that the information security-related beliefs of IT professionals tend to influence the securityrelated beliefs of members of other professions within organizations?
o
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o





Why do you think IT professionals influence the security-related beliefs of members of other
professions within organizations?



How do you think members of the IT profession are influencing the security-related beliefs
of other professionals within organizations?

If the respondent answered NO,


Why do you think IT professionals do not influence the security-related beliefs of members
of other professions within organizations?



How do you think members of the IT profession can do better to influence the securityrelated beliefs of other professionals within organizations?

Do you think IT professionals in general influence security initiatives within organizations (set the tone for it)
or follow what management has planned?
o

What makes you think so?

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CODES
Definition
Beliefs about the need
for validation of their
action by others
including their peers

# of
instances
37

Beliefs about hierarchy
and complying with
hierarchy in
organizations

38

Belief about information
security rules and
procedures, and the
need to comply with
them

24

Belief about rules and
procedures, and the
need to comply with
them

51

General belief about
ethics

28

Belief about familiarity
with the ethical
standards

27

Table B–1: Sample Codes
Sample
Interviewer: To what extent do IT professionals seek validation of their
actions from other people including peers?
Respondent: I think they seek it out frequently.
Interviewer: Why do they seek it out?
Respondent: On the personal level, you know, for egos. I think individuals
like to be special technology professionals. Again, the personalities that
wind up in our particular area like those challenges but, at the same time,
they solve those challenges. Also, you know they like to represent it. I think
from a personal standpoint from human nature they just like to.
Interviewer: Do HR professionals subscribe to the idea of hierarchy in
organizations?
Respondent: Yes. It allows that validation that we just talked about. They
are very big on hierarchy. There is the vice president of HR, and there is
the HR director, HR manager, then HR representative. Only as you get to
certain levels are you given access to more information and ability to make
more and more substantial decisions.
Interviewer: What do they believe about following security rules and
procedures?
Respondent: If you are talking about IT security staff, they tend to put
themselves above them.
Interviewer: I am talking about information security.
Respondent: I think they tend to put the rules in place and then don’t think
they apply to themselves.
Interviewer: Why do they think that it does not apply to them?
Respondent: Because they are ones that created it. They want to control it.
Interviewer: Among HR professionals, what is the belief about abiding to
rules and procedures?
Respondent: It is very important that you must abide by the rules and
procedures.
Interviewer: What is the extent to which they would follow these rules and
procedures?
Respondent: I would say very strong again. If it’s a tactical action, they will
not abide by as much because there probably aren’t any functional aspects
on that. But, for strategic action they would.
Interviewer: Does the professional society that you are associated with
have a formal code of ethics?
Respondent: Yes. We have several courses.
Interviewer: How familiar are others with the code of ethics?
Respondent: Strongly familiar, because you go through training for that.
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued
Professionals’ familiarity
of information security
issues

11

Beliefs about whether
information security is a
cause for concern in
organizations

38

Beliefs about the
connection between
information security and
productivity issues

36

Beliefs about who has
responsibility for
information security in
organizations
Beliefs about who
should have
responsibility for
information security in
organizations
Beliefs toward taking
information security risk

39

Beliefs toward taking
information security risks
to get a job done

33

Beliefs about what
motivates the
professionals

37

Beliefs about the level of
responsibility that professionals prefer for information security issues

15
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Interviewer: How familiar do you think HR professionals are with information
security issues?
Respondent: I would say that their understanding is relatively general.
General in the sense they know what they are told to do by their
management. I don’t think most people know the broader scope of U.S. law
or Texas law for that matter. I have heard a lot of people say that they don’t
know the difference between company policy and the U.S. or state policy.
Interviewer: Do members of your profession [marketing] view IS security as
a serious problem for the organization?
Respondent: Yes, but they ignore it.
Interviewer: Why do they think it is a serious problem?
Respondent: If you are designing a system for security, it comes with more
cost and is difficult to set up… that’s the reason.
Interviewer: How do HR professionals handle choices of trade-off between
getting a job done and securing information?
Respondent: I would say 5 or 10 years ago it would be like just get it done.
It does not matter if you have to break into that system. Today it’s a
different game. People might slide a little bit on keeping passwords real
crazy and that kind of thing. But, the trade-off wouldn’t be acting as a
trouble for the whole system.
Interviewer: Who do members of your profession [marketing] think is
responsible for information security within the organization they work for?
Respondent: The computer information officer or the IT people.

36

Interviewer: Who do members of your profession think should be
responsible for IS security within the organization they are working for?
Respondent: I would say the CIO again, but maybe with more input from
the HR management team.

16

Interviewer: How do accounting professionals feel toward taking information
security risk?
Respondent: I think it depends on the level of information that you have
access to.
Interviewer: What do you mean by that?
Respondent: For example—I give you a live system or a system that has
historical data. The company that I currently work for had just acquired
another company and we would never share passwords for the actual
accounting system, but we had access to historical data for research
purposes in the other accounting system that they were using and we
shared passwords for that. But, it was a dead system. We could not make
entries or change anything. It was strictly read only.
Interviewer: How do marketing professionals feel toward taking information
security risks to get a job done?
Respondent: They might bend the rules.
Interviewer: Why?
Respondent: Because, as far as I am concerned, in my area sometimes
you have to take risks to get the information that you need.
Interviewer: What motivates HR professionals?
Respondent: Being acknowledged as a credible legitimate partner. Not
being held responsible for problems outside the control of an HR person.
An example of that would be—I am trying to get this young kid stationed in
Florida because his mom and dad are both dying there and there is a
special situation that requires that. Well, that is not enough of an action in
order to move a kid to Florida. We have systems where you say we have to
work within these rules and you have to follow them.
Interviewer: What kind of responsibility would they [marketing professionals]
prefer for doing tasks related to information security?
Respondent: I would say full responsibility and be treated like an adult.
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued
Beliefs about the
preference of the level of
guidance needed from
management

37

Belief about the level of
influence that the
professionals want the
manager to exercise

35

Belief about the style of
management that would
be preferred by
professionals
Beliefs about the level of
responsibility that
professionals generally
prefer

38

Belief about the primary
role that professionals
play in organizations

37

Belief about how the
primary role that
professionals play in the
organization contributes
to the overall
performance of the
organization
Beliefs about the relative
importance of tangible
and intangible rewards
for the professionals

36

General belief about
taking risks as part of
the job

38

Beliefs about the role
played by their
professionals with
respect to information
security in organizations

38

31

37

Interviewer: When it comes to making decisions, what level of guidance do
IT professionals need from upper management?
Respondent: I don’t think they need guidance as much as they just need
enabling. Give me the resources and equipment, time, and the money to do
the things that I need to do.
Interviewer: What is the belief about the level of detail that a manager
should get involved in?
Respondent: Lots of it depends upon subordinates and the subordinates’
ability and skill level, their experience. When I first started as a salesperson,
my boss would always help me with the sales call. Then later, whenever my
boss wanted to come with me I was always wondering why? So, at the
beginning whenever I needed help I was very happy to have it.
Interviewer: But, in general, what is the belief?
Respondent: Autonomy is very big for salespeople.
Interviewer: What style of management do marketing professionals
generally prefer?
Respondent: They kind of prefer decentralized. I mean, they just like to
have an open management style.
Interviewer: When it comes to doing any task, what level of responsibility do
IT professionals need or want management to entrust to them?
Respondent: They want to rely on shared responsibility in case there is a
problem that comes on the line that is caused by the misinformation on the
requiring data.
Interviewer: What do HR professionals believe is the primary role their
profession plays in organizations?
Respondent: Several roles; for example, we are advocates and leaders
because we represent employee issues and concerns, as well as
organizational issues and concerns. We have to be good communicators.
We have to be masters of the business. We have to understand what our
company does. We should also facilitate change. We have to always
promote and facilitate change.
Interviewer: How does this [the role of the profession] contribute to the
overall performance of the organization?
Respondent: I think people are the most important part of the company. If
you have a work force that is motivated or relatively satisfying, you know
you are going to realize benefits in terms of the profitability of the company.

Interviewer: How do tangible rewards such as money or promotions
compare to intangible rewards such as enjoyability and challenge, which
they supposedly should be seeking?
Respondent: I think the majority of IT professionals are in the profession
because they believe that it pays better than the other. But, there are other
IT professionals who will enjoy the relative popularity associated with it.
Interviewer: How do accounting professionals feel toward risk taking?
Respondent: I would say they are risk averse, especially from an audit
perspective. Accountants are very stringent on how money is being
categorized because they have to be more conservative on those
guidelines.
Interviewer: What role does a marketing professional think he or she plays
(i.e., information security in organizations)?
Respondent: I think we view it as a very minimal role. We view ourself as
the customers of the IT department.

Volume 33

Article 11

201

Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued
Beliefs about the
sources that influence
the information securityrelated beliefs of
members of their
profession

38

Beliefs about whether
their profession offers
continuing professional
education courses in
information security

37

Beliefs about whether
their profession offers
continuing education
courses to improve
productivity-related skills

35

Profession’s definition of
information security

37

Issues that professionals
would identify with the
term “information
security”

4

The overall outlook
toward job and
profession—optimistic or
pessimistic

37

Profession’s definition of
productivity

35

Beliefs about what their
profession contributes to
society

36

Beliefs about the culture
that members of their
profession share

36

Belief about the core
values that constitute
the profession

37
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Interviewer: Who influences information security-related beliefs of HR
professionals? Would that be your profession, each individual’s
organization, or some other factors?
Respondent: I think organization plays a role and management.
Interviewer: What about their profession?
Respondent: I don’t think so.
Interviewer: Why?
Respondent: I think it’s one of the routine things they do to comply with
company policy and legal policy. They just view it as part of their job.
Interviewer: Do professional associations in your knowledge have securityrelated training or awareness programs or workshops? Do they conduct
these things?
Respondent: I would think they would. It’s a major aspect today. If you look
at any journal in security that’s up there just about every major category of
business is concerned.
Interviewer: In your understanding, do professional associations arrange for
continuing education courses on improving performance?
Respondent: Yes they do. They have training programs and conferences
(They have several conferences a year.) where marketers come together
and learn.
Interviewer: What does the term “information security” mean for HR
professionals?
Respondent: For the most part, it relates to employee management (i.e.,
making sure that every aspect of the employee file is kept confidential).
Only certain individuals have access to various levels of information such
as social security numbers, birthdays, marital status, and other things like
that.
Interviewer: When HR professionals talk about information security, what
actions come into their mind?
Respondent: Controlled access files. They think in terms of filing cabinets
and making sure that they are locked, they think in terms of computer
systems where electronic employee data is kept.
Interviewer: In your opinion, do you think members of the accounting
profession think optimistically or pessimistically?
Respondent: Optimistic.
Interviewer: Why?
Respondent: Because they assume that is the way to do it. So, you just go
ahead and do whatever. They make their own assumptions.
Interviewer: What does the term “productivity” mean to accounting
professionals in organizations?
Respondent: Effective use of time and money to produce a product.
Interviewer: If you had to describe what the accounting profession
contributes to society, what would you say?
Respondent: Again, it plays a middle man role between the managers and
shareholders, banks, and different stakeholders. If there is no accounting or
auditing, then no information can be verified; thus, you cannot rely on
information to make a decision. Therefore, banks cannot trust financial
statements to issue loans and lots of things like that.
Interviewer: If you had to describe the culture of the marketing profession,
how would you describe it?
Respondent: The culture is somewhere in the middle between salespeople
and (Pauses) I do not know. We have to use some techniques like the
salespeople; for example, gaining confidence, being liked by the people
whom we speak to, being a good listener. Also, marketing culture is very
outspoken. I have to make my point and give my opinions.
Interviewer: What would you say the core values of the accounting
profession are?
Respondent: Honesty, integrity, conservatism (I am not sure if that’s a
value).
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued
Belief about how much
the professionals will
fight to uphold the
values of the profession

36

Belief about how
professionals will
respond to detailed
instructions from
management

37

Belief about how
professionals will
respond to detailed
instructions (in
information security
issues) from
management
Beliefs about whether
members of their
profession take
information security
courses as part of their
education
Belief about what
happens when there is a
conflict between the
values of the profession
and the values of the
organization

37

Interviewer: To what extent do marketing professionals believe in the value
that you stated?
Respondent: They would fight for these values. Many times you have to go
out and get the information that you need. You have to speak to people and
you have to let them know that this is confidential. I will not disclose this
information and this is just for me to learn about the market. I am trying to
put that all together and get a big picture of what I am doing, such as
researching. If you let that information slip, then you lose your face value on
your clients.
Interviewer: What would be the response of IT professionals if upper
management tried to specify the details of actions regarding how to do the
task within the domain of expertise of IT?
Respondent: It would be counterproductive and risk going back to
micromanagement. A person of management dictating how to do
something may not be the best way to do it.
Interviewer: What would be the response if management tried to specify the
details of actions outside the domain of expertise of accounting, like
information security?
Respondent: I think that is probably a little bit different, because that is
something that the individual may not be familiar with.

37

Interviewer: Do HR professionals in your opinion take information securityrelated courses as part of their education?
Respondent: I am sure they have some credits they have to fill, but I don’t
know if it is related to security.

37

Interviewer: In case of a conflict between the values of the HR profession
and the values of the organization that they work in, what would happen?
Respondent: They are going to go with the values of the organization,
because that gives them their bread and butter unless it is against the
law—that would be an exception.
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